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Foreword
The provision of an adequate retirement income 
remains one of the biggest challenges facing developed 
economies. Ageing populations and a decline in the 
ratio of workers to retired people means that the 
pressure on state systems will continue to become 
ever more acute. The UK government, like others, has 
moved to increase the state pension age (SPA) in an 
attempt to balance pension finances, while maintaining 
the aim of people spending up to one third of their 
adult life in retirement.  
However, as this report makes clear, the impact of 
health and disability becomes increasingly significant 
once people pass 50 years of age and participation 
in the workforce tails off. Consequently, there are 
limits to how far the SPA can be raised without simply 
shifting people from a state pension onto disability 
benefit. In the absence of a boost to incomes from 
an increase in productivity, something the Office for 
Budget Responsibility has now officially given up 
on, the focus must turn to raising participation rates 
amongst those aged 50 to 70. The report advocates 
an “active ageing” scenario, which sees this group 
increase its participation rate, a development that has 
already begun to happen as more people extend their 
working lives. 
Longer working lives should also help people to 
increase their savings for retirement, something that 
we at Schroders and many others continue to advocate. 
This report adds to that discussion by highlighting the 
challenges faced by women, who often have interrupted 
careers as a result of managing caring responsibilities 
alongside participation in the workforce. More generally, 
the report draws attention to the complexity of the 
savings and retirement decision in a world of uncertain 
health and individual responsibility. In particular, there 
is a compelling call for more information to be made 
available to those in DC pension schemes so as to make 
the best decisions on when and how rapidly to draw on 
their pension savings.
Clearly, the private sector has a significant role in helping 
to meet these challenges and Schroders is very happy to 
be supporting this report in conjunction with the CSFI. 
Lesley-Ann Morgan
Global Head of Defined Contribution and Retirement
Schroders
Keith Wade
Chief Economist
Schroders
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Preface
A cynic might say that we would be lucky to live long 
enough to face the problems identified in this report. 
Maybe, but the problems of financing old age in an era 
of increasing longevity, less security of employment and 
the decline/disappearance of the old defined benefit 
pension plan are enormous. Governments (of whatever 
hue) are not unaware of the problem, and are making 
efforts to tackle it – inter alia by auto-enrolment of 
workers into pension schemes (eg Nest), by removing the 
burdensome annuitisation requirement, by eliminating 
the mandatory retirement age, and (most controversial of 
all) by nudging the State Pension Age up. 
But is that enough? 
This report – written by Professor Les Mayhew of the 
Cass Business School, at City University (and a former 
senior civil servant in the DHSS, DSS, Treasury and 
ONS) – suggests that it is not. And that even the report 
produced by John Cridland in March 2017 may have 
been too optimistic in its recommendations as to what 
needs to be done to maintain the sustainability of the 
present pension promise. 
Prof Mayhew’s contribution is to focus not simply on 
longevity, but on what he calls ‘active ageing’. Raising 
the SPA will not, by itself, resolve the problem unless it 
is accompanied by measures to reduce disability (physical 
or mental), to encourage older workers to remain 
employed, and (linked to that) to shift the point of peak 
earnings towards older workers. If, by a combination of 
education and preventative health care, we can increase 
the percentage of older workers (whether or not they 
define themselves as disabled) in work, the government’s 
goal of providing a state pension that is roughly one-
third of average earnings to fund a retirement that is up 
to one third of a person’s adult life is realistic. Otherwise, 
the future looks pretty bleak. 
This is an important report, using new tools that cast 
a cold eye on one of the biggest challenges facing any 
government – a challenge that cannot be wished away. I 
am very grateful to Prof Mayhew for all his work – and 
for letting us publish the results. I am also very grateful 
to Schroders and Cass for their support, and to my 
colleague, Jane Fuller, whose interest in pensions is well-
known and who worked with Les at all stages. Many 
thanks to all of them. 
Andrew Hilton
Director
CSFI
Executive Summary
The UK population is forecast to grow from 65m in 
2015 to 75m in 2040, with the number aged 65-plus 
set to increase by 50%, from 12m to 18m. The classic 
“dependency trap” is that an ageing society has fewer 
workers to support every pensioner, piling pressure on 
health and social care services, and on the taxpayers that 
fund them. But the standard ratio of those aged 20-64 
to those aged 65-plus is a crude measure of whether an 
economy can thrive as its population ages.
This report, using new data and analytical tools, focuses 
on economic activity, which starts to tail off when people 
reach 50, with ill health or disability as the biggest single 
cause. This means that raising the state pension age 
(SPA), while necessary, is not sufficient as a response 
to increased longevity. Attention needs to focus on 
improving activity rates in the lengthening run-up to 
retirement. This would raise lifetime earnings and saving 
levels, as well as providing the tax revenues needed to 
fund state benefits.
The main points of the report are:
1.  On current demographic trends, there will be a 50% 
growth in the UK population aged 65-plus by 2040. 
This means that the dependency ratio – the number 
of people aged 20-64 compared with those aged 65-
plus – would deteriorate from more than three times 
to just over two times if nothing were done. 
2.  Just as important as age is economic activity, which 
deteriorates once individuals reach 50 – and does 
so rapidly from 55. A major cause of inactivity is 
ill health, and disabling conditions increase with 
age. So raising the SPA is not enough to mitigate 
the adverse impacts of ageing on the economy and 
people’s capacity to earn and save.
3.  The key challenge for policy-makers, shared with the 
private sector, is to seek ways to improve economic 
activity rates between the ages of 50 and 70.  This 
includes public policy initiatives to prevent or delay 
the onset of ill health, employers’ efforts to create 
more opportunities for workforce participation, and 
financial services products that mitigate the effects.
4.  The good news is that economic activity rates 
are growing among those over 60, albeit from a 
low base. This is in response to the increase in 
the women’s SPA and the abolition of a default 
retirement age. But healthy life expectancy, and 
related activity rates, vary significantly between UK 
districts, indicating the importance of measures to 
narrow the gaps in local outcomes.
5.  Gender variations in total life-time earnings remain 
substantial, with men earning – on average – 80% 
more than women. This reflects the impact of career 
breaks, part-time jobs and lower-paid work on the 
CSFI
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average total earned by women, with a knock-on 
effect on pension prospects. This report suggests that 
working partners should be able to contribute to the 
pension funds of non-working partners.
6.  Overlapping caring responsibilities for children 
and elderly relatives – the ‘sandwich years’  - are a 
growing phenomenon, but they can be predicted, 
which suggests that bespoke insurance, or care 
annuity, products could be developed.
7.  To expand earnings/savings capacity (and the 
tax take to pay for pensions) at older ages, three 
things need to happen: earnings should peak later 
to improve incentives to stay in work; economic 
activity rates need to rise from age 50; and 
productivity should go up. The first two are moving 
in the right direction, but productivity remains flat.
8.  To help people assess whether they are on course to 
accumulate sufficient pension savings, this report 
suggests a bespoke calculator that can combine the 
outcomes from a series of contributions. This would 
aid decisions about whether to work for longer and 
save more.
9.  The government has stated that people should 
expect to spend up to a third of adult life in 
retirement, namely in receipt of a state pension. This 
is only sustainable if activity rates rise sufficiently, as 
modelled in this report.
10.  The stakes are high: the state pension accounts for 
about 12% of public spending, so it is important 
both to raise activity rates and manage pension costs. 
Taking into account the impact of disability on 
dependency, our calculations suggest that the SPA 
might need to rise even faster than proposed by the 
Cridland review, which would mean abandoning the 
one-third target.
11.  The dependency trap, representing the economic 
and fiscal conflict between the working population 
and pensioners, can be avoided by raising taxes, 
cutting pension benefits and/or increasing economic 
activity. Clearly, the last is the least painful.
12.  This report advocates an ‘active ageing scenario’. 
Raising the activity rate of the working age 
population from 80% to 85% could be achieved via 
a 17.5% uplift in activity rates among those aged 
50 and over. This would have the effect of slowing 
down planned rises in the SPA after 2030. This 
scenario would be good both for individuals and 
their capacity to save, and for the nation’s economic 
and fiscal outlook.
CSFI
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Introduction
The dependency trap usually refers to societies in which 
the population becomes over-reliant on government 
handouts. In this research, however, we are using it to 
describe a society that is sleep-walking into a conflict 
between the competing needs of an ageing population 
for a decent pension and a working-age population 
that is struggling to save for retirement, with the issues 
compounded by inequalities in health and income.
Welfare systems built to protect against these 
eventualities are under increasing strain, and a 
balance has to be struck between raising taxes to pay 
for protection and limiting the financial burden on 
working families. An ageing population increases these 
dependencies because the number of older people 
requiring financial and other support grows relative 
to the working-age population’s ability to provide 
it. This has the potential to lead to a slowdown in 
economic growth, in the absence of off-setting rises in 
productivity.1
The ageing process is associated with reduced levels of 
economic activity, increasing frailty and diminishing 
cognitive ability. However, a theme in this research is 
that reduced economic activity does not begin with 
retirement. For example, a well-educated population is 
more likely to be healthier and economically successful 
than one that is not, regardless of whether it is ageing 
(and better educated people are less likely to work in 
jobs that are susceptible to physical infirmity). According 
to Sasson2, the poorest in society are more likely to fall 
victim to the cumulative effects of decades of unhealthy 
lifestyle and income inequality. He argues that the 
wealthier tend to adopt healthy behaviour, and hence are 
better placed to avoid or defer problems.
Staying healthy enables us to postpone the day when we 
are too frail to work or too ill to live independently. As a 
population ages, average health levels decline and so our 
success as a country in improving longevity paradoxically 
stores up problems. We eventually become victims of our 
own success because growth is harder to sustain. Unless 
that ageing population is supported by increased output 
per worker, potential economic problems include labour 
shortfalls that may fuel immigration, reduced pensioner 
benefits and so on, all of which need to be managed and 
planned for.
It is commonly observed that since productivity 
declines with age, the antidote will need to come from 
elsewhere, such as new technology. However, there is 
another argument, namely that if more people become 
economically active and in better health, they would 
be enabled to work – and save – for longer. Although 
this appears obvious, there are obstacles, including 
maintaining a healthy lifestyle and having self-belief. 
There are also competing obligations such as caring for 
sick children, elderly relatives or people with disabilities 
– all essential activities, but hard to plan for and costly in 
terms of time and money.
Lessening some of these obstacles would enable a greater 
percentage of the population to be economically active. 
People would be able to work for longer, have more 
financial choices in the latter part of their lives and be 
less dependent on others. Employers would value older 
workers more than they do now for their skills and 
experience. However, as this report will argue, progress 
towards this better state is far too slow. The looming 
dependency trap is, therefore, a wake-up call to policy 
makers and all those with an interest in ageing.
1. Mayhew, L. (2009), 'Increasing longevity and the economic value of healthy ageing and working longer', HMG Cabinet Office Strategy Unit.
2. Sasson, I. (2016). Trends in life expectancy and lifespan variation by educational attainment: United States, 1990-2010 Demography. ISSN 0070-3370
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The report points out that rises in longevity are not much 
use without accompanying improvements in healthy life 
expectancy. If the gap expands, more taxes will be diverted 
to pay for health and social care, upward pressure on the 
state pension age (SPA) will increase and the proportion 
of adult life spent in retirement will shrink. Meanwhile, 
taxes will rise and average income fall. The result would 
be to widen the inequality gap between rich and poor, and 
the healthy and unhealthy. Although becoming unhealthy 
at a relatively early age does not have to mean that life 
is foreshortened, it negatively affects a person’s ability to 
build up a pension and could hasten dependency. 
Most of these arguments are well known, but they 
tend to operate in silos such that the inter-connectivity 
between an improvement in health, higher activity rates 
and better pensions is obscured. One manifestation of 
this is that, as a society, we put relatively few resources 
into prevention because we never measure its value. This 
report tries to rectify this by bringing together analytical 
tools and new data to answer questions such as: how can 
the economy expand with an ageing population? And, 
by how much would activity rates need to increase to 
reduce dependency? 
Figure 1 sets out these important relationships. The top 
level is human capital, whether healthy or unhealthy. A 
healthier population is more productive and flexible than 
an unhealthy one, and so staying fitter for longer should 
become a strategic goal. The population is divisible into 
economically active and inactive, and the data show 
that disabled people are more likely to be economically 
inactive or unemployed. This tendency increases with 
age, especially from age 50.
Figure 1: Relationship between economic activity, productivity, pensions and taxes – a 
demographic perspective 
Population
Healthy Unhealthy/disabled
Economically 
active
Economically 
inactive
Income  &           
tax credits
State pension & 
other benefits
Taxes
Net income
Human capital
Productivity
Re-distribution
Consumption Savings & 
investments
Inequalities
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The length of a working life is conventionally measured 
from age 20 to the SPA, but these boundaries are largely 
false as some people have much longer/shorter working 
lives than others. This is reflected in earnings (a proxy 
for productivity), which on average peak in a person’s 
40s before declining. But what causes earnings to peak, 
and is decline inevitable? Is the peak changing over time 
in response to population ageing? And how has ageing 
affected average earnings at older ages compared with 
that of younger people? 
Since women are more likely to experience interrupted 
careers, through bringing up children or looking after 
elderly or sick relatives, their lifetime pattern of earnings 
and economic activity is a barometer of different 
pressures in society, such as how to balance caring roles 
with careers. Questions include whether more women are 
now working at every age; how career breaks affect their 
lifetime earnings and ability to save for a pension; and 
whether there is a squeezed generation who are balancing 
work with caring for children and elderly parents.  
These issues are strategically important not just 
because of intergenerational fairness and sufficiency 
of income at an individual level, but also because of 
affordability and economic management in a society that 
is simultaneously growing in size and ageing. The UK 
population is forecast to grow from 65m in 2015 to 71m 
in 2030 and 75m in 2040. In between, the number of 
people aged 65-plus will increase from 12m in 2015 to 
18m in 2040, while the number aged 20-64 will level 
out at about 40m.  
The dependency ratio
The dependency ratio measures the pressure that a 
growing number of pensioners places on the tax-paying 
working population. It is customary to align the lower 
age with labour force entry and the upper age with 
the point when state retirement benefits kick in. The 
standard ratio has divided those aged 20-64 by those 
aged 65-plus, it was 3.7 in 20073. But since then, with 
baby boomers starting to retire, it has turned down 
sharply and would fall to 2.2 by 2040 without increases 
in the SPA. The dramatic fall in the ratio has become a 
major strategic concern. 
The deterioration in the ratio after 2007 would have 
been worse without an influx of migrants from Europe 
and elsewhere – around three million since 2000. The 
UK government aims to reduce future immigration 
from about 250,000 a year to the ‘tens of thousands’, 
after Britain leaves the European Union. The effect will 
not be felt immediately, unless existing migrants return 
home, but it has the potential to put further pressure on 
the dependency ratio.
These changes are taking place against a background of 
rising life expectancy. Although increases have slowed in 
the last few years, the changes of the past 40 years have 
been hugely significant. For example, in 1975 a person 
entering the labour force at 20 had a life expectancy 
of 54.3 years compared with 61.4 today. In addition, 
the longevity gap between men and women has been 
closing.4 Underlying this trend are significant changes in 
male lifestyles and occupations, which have seen a fall in 
tobacco-related deaths and heart disease, and fewer men 
working in hazardous occupations.
Higher up the age scale, increasing longevity has also 
dramatically affected the age at which people die. For 
men the modal age (at which the most deaths occur) rose 
from 72 to 84 between 1975 and 2015 and, for women, 
from 80 to 89. Changes on this scale are to be celebrated 
as testimony to how far society has advanced in just 40 
years. But they mask another, more troubling, trend: the 
persistent and growing inequality in life-span between 
the richest and poorest areas of the country. Inequalities 
on the scale described in this research are a drag on the 
economy because they dis-enable people from reaching 
their potential.5
3.  Sometimes the dependency ratio is expressed as the number of pensioners per worker i.e. the inverse. Although school-leaving age is 16, the use of the age 
range 20-64 is more meaningful because of the impact of further education, training and other factors on the 16-19 cohort.
4.  Mayhew L. D., Smith,, D. (2014), 'Gender Convergence in Human Survival and the Postponement of Death', North American Actuarial Journal,   
18(1), p.194-216
5.  Mayhew L.D, Smith D. (March 2016) ‘An investigation into inequalities in adult lifespan’, London: International Longevity Centre UK (ILC-UK). March 2016
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Report structure
The report begins by analysing the health of the 
population using three different measures: the prevalence 
of disability, disability-free life expectancy and healthy life 
expectancy. As well as the national data, we also highlight 
variations at a local level. This shows that reducing health 
variations is a major imperative as far as managing the 
dependency trap is concerned. Chapter 2 analyses labour 
market activity by age and finds that there are large falls 
in activity rates over the age of 50 and that poor health is 
partly to blame. This means that raising the SPA has its 
limits as a means to expand the workforce. 
Age-related earnings crucially affect the ability to save 
for a pension over a working life. Chapter 3 looks at the 
impact of part-time work and career breaks on women’s 
private pension pots. Currently, the SPA is transitioning 
from 65 to 66 by 2018 (for women from 60 to 66) and 
is due to rise to 67 by 2028 and 68 by 2037-39. 
Chapter 4 explores the affordability of the principle, 
stated by the UK government, that people should 
expect to spend up to one third of their adult life in 
retirement. With no default retirement age, this has 
effectively come to mean in receipt of the state pension. 
The chapter also covers the value of pension benefits 
relative to earnings and the impact on the dependency 
ratio of raising the SPA. 
Chapter 5 looks ahead to 2040 using different scenarios. 
It considers whether the SPA can be kept in line with the 
one-third principle without significant improvements in 
economic activity rates and, by implication, the health 
of working-age adults. The concluding section advocates 
the strategic necessity of a more proactive approach to 
enabling people to work for longer. 
The report also points to the role of the financial 
services sector: in encouraging individuals to enhance 
their life-time earning/saving capacity; in providing 
flexible options when economic activity is interrupted 
or declines; and in helping people to decide how best to 
use their private stores of wealth to supplement the state 
pension.
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Chapter 1:
Life expectancy free of disability 
and in good health
Life expectancy and, within that, state-of-health 
expectancy are important high-level measures for 
population wellbeing. Period life expectancy at a given 
age, for any area, is the average number of years a 
person would live if he or she experienced that area’s 
age-specific mortality rates. Cohort life expectancy, by 
contrast, is based on the mortality experience of the 
specified cohort for a given birth year. This research is 
concerned with both.
In contrast, state-of-health expectancies provide 
estimates of how long a person can expect to live in 
very good health, good health or disability-free. The 
two definitions used today are healthy life expectancy 
(HLE) and disability-free life expectancy (DFLE). 
Data to determine HLE and DFLE are based on self-
assessment and are collected in the Annual Population 
Survey (APS), which is a large rolling survey based 
on some 320,000 households. It covers ages 16 to 
95; the health status of those outside this age range 
is estimated using a combination of census data and 
imputation. 
Box 1 provides details of the questions asked of 
respondents. HLE, which is the simpler of the two, 
establishes whether a person’s health is simply good, 
fair, bad or very bad. DFLE tests whether health or 
disability problems affect one’s ability to carry out 
normal daily activities. These include household chores, 
such as washing and dressing, shopping and so on. It 
also draws a distinction between conditions that affect 
one’s ability to carry out activities of daily living either 
‘a lot’ or ‘a little’. 
The methodology and data collection methods 
have undergone various changes to improve their 
accuracy and to harmonise definitions with those used 
elsewhere. Most notably, these include changes that 
occurred after April 2013 to bring the definition of 
disability into line with the legal definition under the 
2010 Equality Act. The general framework is consistent 
with international practice, as set out, for example, 
in the International Classification of Functioning, 
Disability and Health (ICF), adopted by the World 
Health Organisation.
This research concentrates on the most recent period, 
using data from 2013-15 to measure the prevalence of 
disability by single year of age, and DFLE expectancy at 
birth and ages 20, 50 and 65. It also compares adult health 
expectancies with life expectancy by gender and down to 
district level, in order to provide a window on the ability 
to work at older ages – particularly the range of variation 
between areas of the UK. For actual activity rates, we turn 
to the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which has been brought 
into line with the APS in terms of disability.
The LFS allows a consistent picture to emerge of 
whether a person with a disability is economically 
active or not. The core age range covered by the LFS 
is 16 to 64 – above this age, categories are grouped 
and, therefore, less useful for detailed comparisons. 
However, APS data enable us to look at older ages in 
much finer detail, so that we can impute what levels 
of economic activity to expect assuming the general 
relationship between economic activity and disability 
continues to hold. 
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Of the two definitions, the DFLE is better at 
discerning the capacity to work because it directly 
addresses functional capability, whereas the HLE 
simply deals with illness and general health. In 
particular, the LFS distinguishes people who report a 
health issue, but are not classified as having a long-term 
health problem or disability under the core definition 
of the Equality Act. We use this important legal 
definition to separate people who are economically 
active and disabled from those who are economically 
inactive and disabled. 
The correlation between disability and rates of economic 
activity can be used to estimate how improvements in 
health might potentially translate into higher levels of 
economic activity, while the significant variation in LE, 
HLE and DFLE by local area shows the gap that needs to 
be bridged by way of improvement. Since the reasons for 
economic inactivity can include caring commitments, an 
improvement in general health, or reduction in disability, 
will tend to lessen the demands on carers. In other words, 
there is a double economic benefit depending on whether 
caring commitments are full or part-time.
Box 1: Defining health and disability-free life 
expectancy
Healthy life expectancy is defined as the number of 
remaining years that an individual can expect to live 
in very good or good general health. The APS asks:
How is your health in general; 
would you say it was…
Very good?
Good? 
Fair? 
Bad?
Very bad?
Disability-free life expectancy is defined as the 
number of remaining years that an individual can 
expect to live without a limiting long-standing illness. 
The APS asks:
Do you have any physical or mental health 
conditions or illnesses lasting or expected to last 12 
months or more?
If yes, does your condition or illness/do any of your 
conditions or illnesses reduce your ability to carry-
out day-to-day activities?
Yes, a lot
Yes, a little
No
The respondent is also asked to take account of what 
their situation would be like without medication or 
treatment or any devices such as a hearing aid.
Notes
Guidance is provided on what is meant by activities 
of daily living. These include washing and dressing, 
household cleaning, cooking, shopping for essentials, 
using public or private transport, walking a defined 
distance, climbing stairs, remembering to pay bills 
and a variety of moderate manual tasks.
How much assistance a person needs to carry out 
daily activities is used to judge whether to answer 
‘a little’ or ‘a lot’. ‘A lot’, for example, would be 
appropriate for someone usually needing some level 
of support from family members, friends or personal 
social services for most normal daily activities.
CSFI
CSFI  –  73 Leadenhall Market, London EC3V 1LT  –  Tel: 020 7621 1056  –  E-mail: info@csfi.org  –  Web: www.csfi.org 9
Prevalence of disability and  
ill-health
Ideally, we would like to use data linking census or 
survey records to deaths, as this would enable a direct 
relationship to be identified between mortality and 
health status. The ONS does not currently offer this 
facility to statistics users. However, the question is 
important, especially if it shows that people who become 
ill or disabled at younger ages live for more years than 
those who become ill or disabled at later ages. If true, 
it means that policies that seek to delay the onset of 
disability or ill health through health improvement 
programmes at home, school or in the workplace can be 
better evaluated.
Working with the ONS, we commissioned tables that 
combine data on the prevalence of people in good health 
with standard life tables. Tables by single year of age were 
produced from birth to 95 for each gender (health data 
for ages 95-plus are less reliable for sampling reasons). 
As the following will show, this way of presenting the 
data is extremely useful in uncovering the impact of poor 
health on labour market participation, and especially the 
potential to work at older ages.
The results have obvious ramifications for economic 
output, as well as welfare implications. They emphasise 
that policies to prevent people from becoming unhealthy 
and to promote better health are likely to be cheaper 
than, say, prolonged economic inactivity. Box 2 
demonstrates this point. Chart (a) shows two curves 
based on a standard population of 100,000. The blue 
curve is the number of people who are expected to 
survive using a standard UK life table; the red curve is 
the number at each age that are disability-free based on 
the APS.
The area encapsulated by the two curves represents the 
number of life-years exposed to disability. Dividing this 
quantity by 100,000 gives the difference between DFLE 
and LE from birth (which is how the gap between life 
expectancy and disability-free life expectancy is generally 
expressed). The higher the gap, the greater the number of 
years and proportion of life spent in disability and vice-
versa. In an ideal world, this should be as small as possible.
The ratio between PQ and PS in chart (a) represents the 
prevalence of disability at each age. The horizontal line 
QA, by contrast, represents the approximate number 
of years from becoming disabled to death. It is a crude 
representation because, as noted, it is not possible to link 
the lives in each curve directly. In essence, we assume 
that people die in order of becoming long-term sick 
or disabled. (This breaks down in the case of death by 
accident – hence the approximation.)
Chart (b) is derived from chart (a) and shows the 
prevalence of disability by age. The blue line is for 
people with any disability and the orange one for those 
whose activities of daily living are affected to a lesser 
extent (‘a little’). Overall, disability prevalence follows an 
exponential pattern increasing to over 70% by age 90. 
The prevalence of disabilities with fewer restrictions on 
activities of daily living account for more than half of 
all disability up to about age 50, but it then levels off, 
giving way to more severe disability, which is far more 
typical at older ages. 
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Box 2: Longevity and the prevalence of disability
(a)  Chart showing the population still alive with and without disabilities (Base = 100,000)
Definitions: Prevalence of disability = PQ/PS     Years spent in disability or long term illness = QA
(b) Prevalence of disability in the population based on the APS showing the  ‘lot/little’ boundary
(c) Life expectancy and DFLE at given ages
Age Life expectancy DFLE Health gap 
(years)
% of remaining life 
in good health
0 81.3 62.8 18.5 77.2
20 61.8 45.1 16.7 73.0
50 32.8 20.2 12.6 61.6
65 19.9 10.5 9.4 52.8
Source: ONS
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Table (c) of Box 2 shows LE and DFLE at birth, and at 
ages 20, 50 and 65. Although this shows the expected 
pattern, it conceals the wide variation between the time 
individuals actually spend in ill health and the averages 
for different cohorts. Also, the severity of any disability 
will vary from person to person and this will affect the 
ability to work. In Chapter 2, we investigate further the 
relationship between disability and economic activity 
and how it varies with age. 
Another important finding is that the number of years 
from the age of onset of a disability to death reduces on 
average by six to seven months each year. This suggests 
that a person who contracts a long-term limiting illness 
at age 20 can expect, on average, another 43 years of 
life; at 50 it is 26.3 years and at 65, 17.7 years. This 
reinforces the point that delaying the onset of a limiting 
illness significantly reduces the proportion of remaining 
adult life spent in ill health. Not only is this beneficial 
to individuals but also to society as a whole because it 
reduces life-time healthcare costs.
One reason that age 50 is worth a closer look is that this is 
when economic activity rates peak, with a decline setting 
in well before the SPA. A disability-free man of 50 can 
expect about another 20 years free of disability, but this 
hides a lot of variation. The data show that at age 50, 19% 
of men have some form of disability (9% ‘a lot’), and 25% 
of women (11% ‘a lot’).  By 65, a third of men and 35% of 
women have some form of disability. The 50% threshold 
occurs at 78 for men and 76 for women. Average levels of 
disability in the whole adult population are 23%, and in 
the working age population (20 to 64) 19%. 
These insights apply at national level, but disaggregated 
data at a district level show significant variations in life 
expectancy and even more variation in disability-free 
and healthy life expectancy. Since disability is a key 
determinant of economic inactivity, we compared the 
HLE of men and women living in different areas in 
order to assess differences in the potential capacity to 
work. If HLE is relatively high, we assume the capacity is 
greater than if it is low. When it is low, more people are 
dis-enabled since the prevalence of disability is higher.  
ONS aggregates the results into age bands so, for 
practical reasons, we chose a midpoint age of 52, rather 
than 50, for this part of the analysis. In Figure 2, HLE is 
plotted against life expectancy by district, with each data 
point representing a different district and the dotted, 
best-fit, line representing the average trend. The vertical 
lines (AB and PQ) show the gap between HLE and LE 
at either end of the life expectancy range. The larger the 
gap, the greater the number of remaining years spent 
in ill health or disability, and hence a greater level of 
dependency than for a person in good health. 
The extremities of the distribution range from male 
HLE at age 52 of 10.7 years in Tower Hamlets to 25.3 
years in Wokingham, Surrey. Now, assume a hypothetical 
SPA of 70: a man aged 52 would require at least 18 
years of healthy life to be sure of being fit for work up 
to that age, although this would depend on the type of 
occupation. Based on district level data, the figure of 
18 years would currently only be achievable in 68% of 
districts across the UK. For women at 52, HLE reaches 
28.6 years in the Orkney Islands, and the equivalent 
ranges are AB = 12.5 years and PQ = 15.2 years. Hence, 
the size of gap is greater, but the range of variation is less. 
There is a well-established positive correlation between poor 
health and deprivation and low income and educational 
attainment. An implication of our findings is that back-to-
work policies for people aged 50-plus will be less effective 
in deprived, low-skilled areas where poor health is endemic. 
Policies that maintain and prolong good health are more 
likely to bear fruit by increasing the long-term capacity to 
work in a wider range of occupations where any form of 
disability is a barrier. The key point is that the causes of 
disability are amenable to change if policies can be targeted 
at preventable conditions causing the most harm.
As socio-economic position is an indicator of working 
conditions, one expects to see a higher prevalence of 
activity limitation among those working in manual 
occupations. However, with the shrinkage of hazardous 
jobs associated with heavy industry, the causes of ill-
health and disability are increasingly linked to lifestyles 
rather than particular occupations. For example, 
research has shown that some in manual occupations 
in more affluent areas have the same DFLE as those in 
managerial or professional occupations living in more 
deprived areas. Thus, context is important, including 
geography and local health behaviours. 
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Figure 2: Variations in healthy life expectancy at district level in the UK as compared with life 
expectancy
Key: Line AP = life expectancy; Line BQ = healthy life expectancy
Source: ONS
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Implications: income replacement
The 2013 Sergeant Review of Simple Financial 
Products commissioned by the UK Government 
recommended that, as a high priority, the industry 
(led by the Association of British Insurers) should 
work on an income replacement product. This would 
address directly the risk of becoming disabled and 
losing earning capacity. The increased fragmentation 
of employment and growing ranks of self-employed – 
to nearly 5 million – suggest that demand ought to be 
growing for this type of product. 
However, four years on, in early 2017, the ABI 
abandoned the project. According to FTAdviser, the 
industry body said the environment had changed 
and claimed that “better and more effective 
mechanisms have emerged to deliver on the aims 
of the Sergeant Review”. Sue Lewis, chairman of 
the Financial Services Consumer Panel, questioned 
whether the industry was motivated to produce 
“straightforward, easy to understand, value for 
money products”. 
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Chapter 2:
Labour market activity and health
Poor health, whatever its causes, can be seen as a 
strategic issue in an ageing society, especially where it 
becomes a constraint on economic growth and leads, 
for example, to higher taxes. In this chapter, we analyse 
the relationship between work and health in greater 
depth. We consider the relationship between economic 
activity and age, and how it is affected by health. To 
understand the transitional processes over the life cycle, 
it is necessary to analyse the data at a finer level of detail 
than is typically the case.
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) defines adults as either 
economically active or inactive, but it also subdivides 
them according to whether they are disability-free, or 
not. In theory, a person can be in one of four states: 
economically inactive and disability-free; economically 
active and disabled; economically active and disabled; 
and economically active and disability-free. Note that 
an unemployed person is one who is seeking work, and 
is therefore deemed to be economically active from a 
labour market perspective.
As annex A explains, the LFS distinguishes people 
who report a health problem, but are not classified as 
having a long-term health problem or disability under 
the Equality Act (2010). Importantly, the harmonised 
definition of disability is now the lead statistic for the 
labour market status of disabled people in Britain (the 
Act does not apply to Northern Ireland). As was seen 
in Box 1, this includes anyone who says they have a 
long-term physical or mental health condition or illness, 
regardless of the impact this may have on their ability to 
work or carry out day-to-day activities. 
However, there are some caveats to this. Since the 
current definition of health has only recently become 
available, we are unable to report changes over time in 
levels of economic activity by age, using a consistent 
definition. The data also rely on people acknowledging 
they have a health problem, which not all do. Because 
the LFS mainly samples people of working age, 
information about workers aged 65-plus tends to be 
less reliable and based on small samples, so we have 
used the Annual Population Survey (APS), with which 
the LFS is harmonised, to help fill the gaps. 
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the population, in 
millions, based on the four defined groups. A and 
B refer to the inactive population, either healthy or 
disabled, and C and D to the economically active, 
either healthy or disabled. The 65-plus age group can 
be divided into economically active or inactive, but 
cannot be reliably broken down further. From October 
2015 to September 2016, 30.9m were economically 
active from age 20-64, and 17.1m inactive. Of the 
6.7m disabled aged 20-64, identified by the LFS (18% 
of the total), 3m were economically inactive and the 
rest active.
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Since the APS and LFS surveys are conducted for 
statistical purposes, they are unrelated to other purposes 
such as determining a person’s eligibility for disability 
benefits, which entails a completely different process. A 
straightforward claimant count would lead to different 
totals, partly because some are entitled to more than one 
benefit, and also due to definitional differences. When 
this is taken into account, the DWP puts the number of 
inactive working-age claimants of disability benefits at 
2.9m, which comes close to the 3m figure in category B 
(1.45m  + 1.55m = 3m).6
Further insights are obtained when these figures are re-
presented by single year of age. Box 3 gives a proportional 
split of the population, from 16 onwards, into the four 
categories. The general picture is that the economically 
active population starts to level out after age 23 as 
graduates move into employment, and this continues until 
55, after which the rate of economic inactivity rises steeply. 
The LFS gives the main reason for economic inactivity as 
sickness and disability, but other important categories are 
looking after a home or caring (especially among women), 
early retirement or being a student – although their relative 
importance varies over the life cycle. 
The next significant change occurs at around 70. By 
this age, the percentage of people who are economically 
active has fallen to less than 12% of the population. The 
rest consists of 36% who are inactive disabled and 52% 
who are inactive and disability-free. At older ages, the 
proportion that is inactive and disability-free falls steeply, 
with 70 marking a turning point. The significance of this 
is that rises in the SPA beyond 70 cannot be relied upon 
to produce people available to work because the number 
that are not disabled (i.e. without a long-term limiting 
illness) dwindles rapidly.
6.  Although the totals correspond, it does not mean that there is a perfect match between people claiming benefits and these responding to the surveys and vice versa. 
Some may not claim benefits for which they may be entitled and others claim benefits to which they are not entitled.
Table 1: The number of people in different age groups by economic activity and health status 
(October 2015 to September 2016; millions)
Key Category 20-49 50-64 65+ (1) Total (2)
A Economically inactive disability-free 2.48 1.54
B Economically inactive disabled 1.45 1.55 9.91 17.13
C Economically active disabled 2.33 1.35
D Economically active disability-free 18.78 7.03 1.17 30.87
Total 25.04 11.47 11.09 47.60
Notes: (1) & (2) Totals include people who did not state their health
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey
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Box 3: Economic activity by age in 2015 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey October 2015 to September 2016
Chart showing the proportion of the population aged 15-80 in one of four given states:
A: Economically inactive disability-free;
B: Economically inactive disabled; 
C: Economically active disabled; and 
D: Economically active disability-free 
Notes: (i) The proportion of the population that is economically active starts to level out from age 23; (ii) the 
rate of economic inactivity rises sharply after age 55; (iii) the availability of economically inactive disability-free 
(i.e. potential workers) falls sharply beyond age 70.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3: Econom c activity by age in 2015 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey October 2015 to September 2016 
Chart showing the proportion of the population aged 15-80 in one of four given states: 
(A) Economically inactive disability-free; 
(B) Economically inactive disabled;  
(C) Economically active disabled; and  
(D) Economically active dis bility-free  
 
Notes: (i) The proportion of the population that is economically active starts to level out 
from age 23; (ii) the rate of economic inactivity rises sharply after age 55; (iii) the 
availability of economically inactive disability-free (i.e. potential workers) falls sharply 
beyond age 70. 
 
Figure 3: Change in economic activity rates by single year of age between 2005 and 2015
Source: ONS, LFS
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Gender variations in  
economic activity and   
working to older ages
Levels of economic activity vary between men and 
women, especially in the age range 23 to 55 when levels 
of female economic activity are 10 to 15 percentage 
points less than men’s at similar ages. The child-raising 
years create a gap in women’s income and also affect 
future income-earning potential. 
The most important long-term change has been the increase 
in female activity rates relative to men. In 1970 about 
55% of women aged 16-64 were economically active and 
95% of men. Since then, male rates have fallen to 84% 
and women’s have increased to 74%. The growth in the 
proportion of women in the labour force is strongly related 
to the rising number of mothers re-entering the labour force 
and remaining in employment for longer. This strategic shift 
in patterns of work reflect changes in the labour market, 
in particular a transition from manufacturing to service 
industries and much greater interchangability between 
traditionally male and female jobs. 
In the 10 years to 2015, the number of economically 
active people rose from 30.4m to 32.2m,7 reflecting the 
growth in the UK population coupled with a buoyant 
and flexible jobs market. However, change can also be 
seen in the age structure (see Figure 3), with falls in  
the percentage of economically active people below 23  
(for educational reasons) and higher activity rates at 
older ages.
Especially interesting is the growth in economic activity 
from age 60, although from a much lower base. This is 
a reaction not only to the increase in the women’s SPA, 
as well as squeezed household incomes, but also to the 
abolition of the default retirement age of 65. From a 
policy standpoint, the increase in activity rates at older 
ages is a welcome sign that people are responding to 
the stimuli of higher pension ages and the removal of 
barriers to working for longer.
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7.  Mayhew, L.D., D. Smith and B. Rickayzen (2017) Flexible and affordable methods of paying for long-term care insurance (forthcoming, North American 
Actuarial Journal)
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Life cycle factors affecting mainly 
women in the labour market
The transition to higher female participation in the 
labour force has run in parallel with significant changes 
in household structures and living arrangements. Most 
households are childless, fewer people are getting married 
and those who do are more likely to end up divorcing. 
These trends have been accompanied by an increase in the 
average age at which first marriages occur, and by rising 
levels of cohabitation as a replacement for, or pre-cursor 
to, marriage. More women enter university today and the 
delay in child-bearing is linked to their educational level. 
Access to further education has been the most important 
driver of changes in female labour market behaviour. 
Although women have overtaken young men in terms 
of average educational attainment, men and women still 
engage in different fields of study. While a large proportion 
of females graduate with degrees in humanities, female 
participation in science and engineering remains relatively 
low, affecting future earning prospects. Many women 
choose careers such as teaching or nursing that pay less but 
are more flexible, in which career breaks and a return to 
work are easier to manage.
These factors also account for a much larger share of 
female than male employment being part-time. Despite 
an improvement in the labour market situation for 
women, gaps persist in employment outcomes. These are 
reflected in differences in responsibility levels, with fewer 
women in managerial positions, leading to lower life-
time earnings and poorer pension prospects. This means 
they find it harder to be financially independent of their 
partners, and poorer still if they are a lone parent trying 
to juggle raising children with work. 
In general, couple households give rise to more resilient 
living arrangements, especially those in which there are 
two incomes and access to affordable childcare. Family 
breakdown is expensive from a personal and welfare 
payment standpoint, and so it is to the state’s advantage 
to pursue policies that respond to people’s needs at 
different points in the life cycle. Labour market policies 
tend to be of the ‘single issue’ variety, such as equal 
pay, the minimum wage, maternity or paternity leave. 
Pension arrangements, in contrast, tend to be centred on 
the individual rather than the household or family.
Caring for ageing relatives or a sick partner is a good 
example of how unexpected events can affect employment 
prospects in unpredictable ways. Data on the Carers 
Allowance, a UK benefit for people with caring 
responsibilities, show that women are the main carers, with 
their numbers peaking between ages 35 and 59. Some 
care durations last 10 years or more – although the average 
is much less. The same data show that male carers are 
much fewer, but gradually increase in number with age – 
presumably looking after a sick parent or partner.
An increasingly common phenomenon is overlapping 
caring responsibilities towards children and elderly parents, 
which are demographic in origin. The affected cohort has 
been dubbed the ‘sandwich’ or ‘pivot’ generation, but how 
predictable is this eventuality and what can be done? Using 
newly available data on health, it should be possible to model 
with greater clarity the prospective timing and duration 
of sandwich years. This would enable the development of 
bespoke insurance policies and financial products, such 
as care annuities, to tide people over the loss of income8. 
Although a full analysis is beyond the scope of this research, 
a simple rule of thumb is proposed for determining the 
potential number of sandwich years, based on the birthdays 
of the youngest child and oldest grandparent.9
Consider three generations with the middle one caring 
for the generation on either side. If the age at which 
children attain independence is  and the age at 
which elderly care starts is , then the condition for 
sandwich years to occur is  , where  
is the youngest child’s year of birth and  is the oldest 
grandparent’s year of birth, with the number of sandwich 
years given by  .  For example, 
assume the child was born in 1993 and the grandparent 
in 1920; let  equate to adulthood, i.e. age 18, and the 
age of infirmity  be 85. The formula predicts up to six 
sandwich years in this example – depending on when the 
grandparent dies. Clearly, this would not have arisen had 
the youngest child been born six years earlier.
8.  Mayhew, L.D., D. Smith and B. Rickayzen (2017) Flexible and affordable methods of paying for long-term care insurance (forthcoming, North American 
Actuarial Journal)
9. Mayhew, L.D.(2010) The UK Care Economy: Improving Outcomes for Carers. Commissioned report by Carers UK.
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Implications: the employment gap
The cost of working-age disability-related benefits 
is a longstanding issue. Numerous government 
attempts over many years have not reduced the 
problem by nearly enough. There is controversy, for 
example, over the issue of whether older long-term 
unemployed people are simply ‘parked’ on disability 
benefits until they qualify for the state pension. 
A government report published in November 2017, 
‘Improving Lives: the future of work, health and 
disability’, set out how the aim of seeing one million 
more people in employment, over the next decade, 
might be achieved. It proposes a target of halving 
what it calls the disability employment gap – the 
difference between the employment rates of disabled 
and non-disabled people. Action recommended for 
employers ranges from recruitment and retention of 
disabled workers to managing employee ill health. 
While the long-term aim must be to improve the 
capacity for people to work for longer through health 
improvement, in the short term there is a transitional 
gap caused by rises in the SPA, affecting women in 
particular, and the large cohort of disabled people of 
older working age. 
Some have criticised the legal framework allowing 
people to access pension savings from 55, saying 
that it depletes the pot too early. But there are two 
important reasons for allowing access 10 years 
before the SPA (and as that rises, this may become 
even more important). 
The first is as a bridge to the state pension, covering 
a decline in earnings from about the age when, as 
this report shows, it becomes more likely. The second 
is that the lump sum can be used to pay off debt, 
including mortgage debt, so reducing outgoings at a 
time when earnings go into decline or become less 
certain. 
The  ‘Independent Review of the State Pension Age’, 
led by John Cridland (presented to Parliament in 
March 2017), suggests a ‘Mid-Life MOT’ to provide 
holistic financial advice with a 30-year time horizon. It 
is envisaged that employers would be the facilitators. 
Since most employers have no experience of this, 
the most effective provider of advice and guidance is 
the financial services industry, which is more used to 
dealing with individual financial circumstances.
Our report highlights the risk that, for women in 
particular, careers may be interrupted by caring 
responsibilities. It notes that ‘sandwich years’, where 
caring for children and an elderly relative overlap, are 
becoming more frequent but also predictable. This 
is an example of where innovation in annuity design 
could help cover short-term income shortfalls.
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Chapter 3:
Earnings and pension adequacy   
over the life cycle
The traditional career path of staying in one job 
throughout one’s working life is no longer the norm; 
instead people are more likely to have one profession 
but multiple jobs with several employers. This is why 
a good education and professional qualifications are an 
important form of income protection – a so-called ‘meal 
ticket’ for life. The bottom line is that the ability to save, 
start a family, buy a house and pay off loans is related 
to income over the life cycle, where the main form is 
remuneration from work.
For those who have paid down debt and accumulated 
wealth, income streams will tend to diversify, and having a 
job becomes less important. For others, work remains the 
main source of income – but, as we have seen, the ability 
to work is also dependent on health. In the UK, there 
are 2.9 million working-age people claiming disability 
benefits10 worth £36bn a year (the actual number who are 
economically inactive and disabled is closer to 3m, based 
on the LFS, but not everyone claims or is eligible). DWP 
data show that of the total number of disability benefit 
claimants, around 48% also claim housing benefit, adding 
another estimated £7bn to the cost.
The question addressed in this chapter concerns the 
ability of men and women to build up a private, or 
defined-contribution (DC), pension during careers 
that may be interrupted by spells of inactivity and job 
change, or shortened by ill health, disability or other 
circumstances. The results are presented in tabular 
form along the lines of: ‘If I worked for x years and my 
income was the typical average for my age, what size of 
pension pot could I accumulate?’
Clearly, it is not possible to know for certain what 
investment returns will be, how much income you will 
have, whether you will become sick or disabled, or the 
ultimate size of your pension pot(s). However, the issue 
is strategically important for three reasons. The first is the 
demise of defined-benefit (DB) pension schemes based 
on length of service and final salary. These arrangements 
are costly to employers and do not fit neatly with modern 
flexible career paths. Second, the gap left by falling DB 
provision needs to be filled by other schemes – typically 
DC, in which the individual bears the risk in terms of 
how much to save, investment performance and when – 
and how – to cash in a pension. Third, the higher SPA 
will force people to consider how to cover any income gap 
without necessarily having to work for longer.
We choose as our example a person, man or woman, who 
earns the average for his or her age over the life cycle. Bearing 
in mind variations in the pattern of pension contributions, 
we assume that a person can start or terminate contributions 
at any time, depending on their situation and the job they 
are in. In general, the sooner a person starts to save for a 
pension, the longer funds will be invested and the greater 
the eventual returns. For interrupted careers, contributions 
may cease for a period before resuming, and so the eventual 
pension pot will be smaller.  
10.  Figure based on working-age individuals and includes benefit combinations comprising employment support allowance, incapacity benefit, severe disablement 
allowance, injury benefit, disability living allowance, and personal independence payments (source: DWP). 
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Average annual earnings by 
age and gender
Men and women’s gross annual average earnings by year 
of age are shown in Box 4. Based on ONS data from 
the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), the 
chart combines full and part-time work to derive a fair 
representation of the earnings potential of individuals, 
regardless of the hours worked. Although the data are 
sparse for people above the SPA or below 20, and do not 
include other income sources, we find that age-related 
male annual earnings closely follow a parabolic shape, 
peaking at age 47. The roots of the parabola cross the 
axis at 15 and 79 when notional average gross income is 
zero, suggesting a theoretical work span of 64 years!
The picture for women is distorted due to the greater 
incidence of part-time working and interrupted 
careers, the combined effect of which is to depress 
the gross average. For this reason, the figures are not 
representative of their earnings potential. However, if 
we were to compare men and women in full-time work, 
we would still find that annual earnings for women are 
lower, at £28,000 compared with £37,000, based on 
ASHE data. It is also apparent that the same parabolic 
pattern does not apply to women, reflecting the greater 
complexity of their working patterns. For the purpose 
of building a pension, it is life-time earnings that are 
relevant, so we need to weight the averages by economic 
activity rates at each age. 
Taking all this into account, the life-time average 
earnings of men are around 80% greater than for 
women, assuming that the relationship between income, 
age and economic activity holds true over time. Chart 
(b) in Box 4 shows average earnings weighted by age-
related rates of economic activity. Since activity rates are 
always less than 100%, the chart shows average earnings 
to be considerably lower because it includes those 
working and not working. The gap between weighted 
and unweighted earnings expands with age, as inactivity 
increases.
If the pattern in Box 4 in 2015 is compared with that of 
2005, we find that nominal earnings were more at every 
age in 2015. However, after uprating earnings data from 
2005, using changes in the Consumer Prices Index, we 
find that male gross annual earnings, in real terms, are 
lower in 2015 between ages 17 and 55 and higher after 
55. The peak year for earnings in 2005 was 44, compared 
with 47 in 2015. In an ageing population, it is reasonable 
to expect the age at which earnings peak to increase over 
time and rates of economic activity to improve. Indeed, 
this is strategically important for the economy.
The evidence suggests that the purchasing power of 
incomes has fallen at younger ages compared with 
2005, but increased later in life. The Bank of England 
has drawn attention to the fact that productivity levels 
and real wages, which are closely linked, are still not 
back to 2008 levels, although the total number of hours 
worked has increased (see Bank of England Inflation 
Report, August 2017). Poor productivity, compared 
with competitors in global markets, is seen as a major 
weakness of the UK economy, which could get worse as 
the population ages.
Prospects for income in retirement are bound to be 
uncertain, but for them to improve three conditions 
must be satisfied. First, the age at which gross average 
earnings peaks needs to rise to improve work incentives; 
second, economic activity rates need to improve, 
especially at older ages, to boost income and tax 
revenues; and third, productivity needs to increase to lift 
standards of living. The evidence is that the first two of 
these conditions are moving in the right direction, but 
productivity remains flat. Satisfying these conditions will 
positively affect pension saving, expanding the private 
resources available to supplement the state pension. 
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Box 4: Average earnings over the life cycle in 2015 (Source: ONS ASHE)
(a) Male and female gross average annual earnings 2015
(b) Weighted and unweighted male gross average annual earnings
Key: Weighted = Adjusted for economic inactivity
Source: ONS, ASHE
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Impact of working patterns on 
defined contribution pensions 
Notwithstanding pension arrangements in the public 
sector, the closure of DB schemes to new members in the 
private sector and the rise of DC have switched the onus 
of responsibility for pension saving from the enterprise 
to the individual. Money paid into a private pension 
scheme by the individual, plus the tax rebate, and by the 
employer is invested by the pension provider. 
The amount people will ultimately receive depends on how 
much was paid in, how well the investments have done and 
how they decide to take the money out. They can leave it 
invested and draw down regular, or irregular, payments; 
take out a lump sum (a quarter of accumulated funds can 
be withdrawn tax free); or use all or part to buy an annuity 
(See the ‘Implications’ panel at the end of this chapter).
Individuals may have more than one workplace scheme. 
For example, the government estimates that people will 
have an average of 11 jobs during their careers, which could 
mean 11 different pension pots.11 They may also have a 
personal pension – self invested or with an asset manager. 
The number of people with DC schemes has been boosted 
by the introduction of auto-enrolment (AE) in workplaces. 
The employer must automatically enrol employees and make 
mandatory contributions, unless the individual opts out. In 
December, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
published: “Automatic Enrolment Review 2017: Maintaining 
the Momentum”. This proposes lowering the age of entry 
to 18, from 22. While the level of earnings that triggers AE 
would be kept at £10,000, once that is reached the proposal 
is that contributions should be made on every pound earned 
(compared with the current start point of £5,876.).
A key issue remains contribution levels. Even when the 
regime is fully implemented in 2019-20 (and not until 
the mid-2020s for younger workers), the amount being 
saved will only be 8% of earnings, with half coming 
from the employee and the rest from the employer (3%) 
and the tax rebate (1%).
There are some obvious differences between DC schemes 
and entitlement to the state pension. The value of 
the latter depends on the number of years of national 
insurance contributions, and can include care credits. 
The equivalent of 35 years is needed to qualify for the full 
‘new’ state pension of £159.55 a week, or £8,297 a year, in 
2017-18. The amount that will be received is known with 
some certainty in advance of reaching the SPA. 
With private or workplace schemes, there is no income 
guarantee. The outcome is the amount accumulated 
before the individual decides to access it, which they can 
do from 55. Career breaks for caring do not count. This 
disadvantages women, who have lower average annual 
earnings and are more likely to have interrupted careers. The 
breaks make job switches more common, and that can lead 
to a proliferation of pension pots. If they work part-time, 
perhaps in more than one job, they may not earn enough in 
any one place to reach the threshold for auto-enrolment.  
For both men and women who have contributed to a 
series of pension schemes, it is difficult to see all their 
pots in one place or to get information about how much 
they will eventually accumulate. A ‘pensions dashboard’ 
is due to be launched in 2019, following work by an 
ABI-led project group and with the DWP leading on 
the government side. While this may help people to plan 
for retirement, it does not produce predictable pension 
income for elements other than the state pension. 
This report recommends the provision of more 
realistic guides, or bespoke calculators, which combine 
contribution periods with various start and end ages, and 
different crystallisation points. This would not replace 
arrangements enjoyed by higher earners, who make lump 
sum contributions from time to time, but it would assist 
those on more modest earnings, who are considering 
whether to add to their pension savings. 
Box 5 illustrates this for men and women by single year 
of age. It is assumed that the benefits are taken at 65. 
Contribution levels are based on a percentage of average 
annual gross earnings, and the durations are based on 10-
year segments to keep the size of the tables manageable. The 
illustrative contribution rate is 10% of salary per annum 
and the real rate of investment return is 2.5%. Table entries 
represent the amount that would be accumulated at age 65. 
To find the outcomes for pot values, it is necessary to pick 
a start and end age during which contributions are made. If 
a person has more than one contribution spell because of a 
career interruption or is in more than one scheme, the pot 
values of both spells can be added together.
11.  The Pension Tracing Service: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-pension-tracing-service-website-launched
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Box 5:  Pension pots based on gross annual average earnings by age (£000s)
(a) Men
End age
Start age 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
20 0 28 68 118 175 236 297 358 413 458
25  0 47 97 154 215 276 337 392 454
30  0 59 116 177 239 299 354 400
35  0 68 129 190 251 306 352
40  0 73 134 195 250 295
45  0 74 134 189 235
50  0 73 127 173
55  0 67 112
60  0 56
65          0
A man earning the gross national average salary for his age and contributing 10% towards a pension each year, 
compounded annually, would accumulate a pension pot in the ranges given, assuming a real investment return 
of 2.5% pa. It is also assumed that the benefits would be taken at 65 and so would accrue to that age. For 
example, a man saving for a pension from age 30 to 55 would accumulate a pot worth £299,000.
(b) Women
End age
Start age 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
20 0 22 54 89 126 162 196 230 260 285
25  0 37 73 110 145 180 213 244 257
30  0 42 79 115 150 183 214 238
35  0 44 80 115 148 179 203
40  0 43 78 111 142 166
45  0 42 75 106 130
50  0 40 71 95
55  0 37 62
60  0 30
65          0
A woman earning the same as the gross national average salary for her age and contributing 10% towards a 
pension each year, compounded annually, would accumulate a pension pot in the ranges given assuming a real 
investment return of 2.5% pa. The amounts would be less than for a man and even less if career breaks are 
taken into account. For example, if she worked from 25 to 35, then took a break of 10 years before resuming 
work at 45 for another 10 years she would accumulate a pot worth £73,000 plus £75,000 = £148,000.
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Implications: cumulation phase
The messages that need to be imparted include 
that saving even a small amount can add up to a 
meaningful pension pot over four and half decades. 
Particularly important are the contributions from 
employers (3% under the AE regime is a minimum), 
investment returns (the risk-reward concept) and 
compound interest (described by Einstein as ‘the 
greatest mathematical discovery of all time’). 
Tax incentives are an important component of the 
propensity to save, whether through relief on pension 
contributions or tax-free savings vehicles. However, 
asking young graduates to repay their student loans 
and contribute to a pension, while saving for a deposit 
on a house, has become an increasing challenge. This 
calls for better explanations and targeted advice on the 
choices available and best courses of action.
Depending which plan the student loan falls under, 
repayments start at £17,775 or £21,000 (to be raised 
to £25,000) at 9% of salary. Added to 20% income tax 
and 12% National Insurance, this creates a marginal 
tax rate of 41%. Pension saving comes on top of 
this, and so for younger workers the employers’ 
contribution and tax ‘top-up’ are particularly crucial in 
promoting the need for pension saving.
The Cridland review suggested that couples should 
be able to combine their pension saving, following the 
Swiss example. This report believes that the system 
of individual pots and entitlements, as now enacted 
in state pension policy, should be enhanced. One 
partner could be allowed to pay into the pension fund 
of another, utilising the recipient’s spare headroom for 
both contributions and tax relief.  
12.  The minimum contribution (employee and employer) into a workplace pension is 2% of earnings, rising to 5% in 2018 and 8% in 2019. The ‘Independent 
Review of Retirement Income’ (Blake, 2016) recommends 15% of salary to produce a reasonable standard of living in retirement.
13.  Defined contribution pensions are still relatively new and pot sizes vary widely. For persons aged 55-plus and earning between £35,000 and £50,000 a year, the 
average value of pension pots is above £35,000 but the median value is much lower at less than £20,000 (ONS 2010/12 and ABI). In addition many people 
have more than one pension pot and so the true value will be considerably higher.
The results are only illustrative since investment 
performance cannot be guaranteed. The contribution 
rate is higher than in the current AE regime but not 
nearly as high as some experts recommend12. The point 
being underlined is the variation in pension pots caused 
by differences in male-female average earnings over the 
life cycle. Other implications include the importance 
of starting pension saving early and of making 
contributions when earnings are highest. However, it 
also shows that it is never too late to start a pension 
because of contributions by the employer and tax relief, 
although there are limits to both annual contributions 
and the life-time size of the pot.
The way the pot is ultimately used is flexible. While 
buying an annuity is no longer the default option 
for taking pension income, this option does turn the 
accumulated pot(s) into a regular income, which is 
what a DB scheme would do, and so provides a useful 
benchmark. Using the pot sizes shown in Box 5, Annex 
B shows that an index-linked annuity, based on a 
pension pot worth £100,000, would generate a gender-
neutral  (under gender equality regulation) initial annual 
income of £4,329 at age 65. 
For a person to have an annuity as large as the new state 
pension – about £8,300 – the pot size would need to be 
around £192,000 at the point of purchase. Based on the 
table in Box 5, a man on average earnings for his sex, saving 
10% of it a year, could achieve this in as little as 15 years – 
for instance, between 40 and 55. However, a woman saving 
between those ages would only amass £111,000. This is a 
stark demonstration not only that the outcome depends on 
contribution levels, but also that the different patterns of 
male-female earning have a big impact.
While the average value of the typical pension pot is only 
around £35,000, i.e. very small indeed, this can be expected 
to grow as DC systems bed in.13  Also, it masks the fact that 
people may have saved for more than one pension.
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Implications: decumulation phase
A key difference between defined benefit and defined 
contribution schemes is that the former focuses on 
pension income, whereas for the latter, the priority is to 
build up as large a pension pot, or pots, as possible. 
Once that is done, in a DC world, a decision has to be 
made about how to turn the funds into income. 
The pros and cons of three options are set out in 
a 2015 report, written by the author of this report, 
Prof Les Mayhew, and colleagues at Cass Business 
School.14 The options are: withdraw all, drawdown or 
annuitise, and the conclusion is that for most people, 
annuitising is not necessarily the best option. 
Drawdown is preferable, in particular, where the 
individual has a bequest motive and other assets to 
fall back on. 
Our research suggests that people will start to view 
their pension pots, home and other assets collectively 
as a source of retirement funds. This report draws 
attention to the importance of health as an enabler 
for individuals: to continue working to build up their 
pot(s); to have flexibility over when drawdown (or 
annuitisation) starts and unfolds; and to keep funds 
invested in risk-seeking assets for longer (for example 
to pay for long-term care).
14.  Mayhew L., Smith, D., Wright, I. D. (2015), 'Pension pots and how to survive them', London: International Longevity Centre UK (ILC-UK); sponsored by: 
International Longevity Centre UK (ILC-UK)
The way individual circumstances and motives interact with the three options
Ticks indicate generally ‘applies’
Option
Instant and 
flexible access to 
whole pot
Avoid higher rate 
tax implications
Gift or bequest 
opportunity
No danger of 
money running 
low
Avoid IHT 
implications (1)(2)
(A) Withdraw all     
(B) Drawdown     
(C) Annuitise     
1. IHT: Inheritance Tax
2. e.g. if a person with a large pot withdraws all of it but dies before spending it
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Chapter 4: 
The dependency ratio and state 
pension age
The macro-picture places individual experiences in the 
context of economic and demographic trends. Without 
any change, those trends suggest a decline in real 
average earnings, a squeeze on the supply of people able 
to work at older ages, lower pensions and consequent 
problems in sectors such as health and social care. The 
key question facing policy makers is whether the state 
pension system is sustainable, or whether there will be a 
return to the pensioner poverty of previous decades.
In this chapter we use the concept of the dependency 
ratio to evaluate the system’s sustainability. We know 
that people are living longer and that there is upward 
pressure on the SPA, but how long a retirement we will 
have depends on interactions between the SPA, longevity 
and economic activity (generating savings and taxes). 
In a ‘pay as you go’ system, state pensions are paid by 
today’s taxpayers. The PAYG principle is that the cost of 
the state pension must be balanced by national insurance 
and tax payments: the current average ‘contribution rate’ 
is between 13% and 14% of gross salary.
Another policy principle, set out by the government in 
2013 (Autumn Statement), is that people should expect to 
spend, on average, up to one third of adult life in retirement. 
Effectively, this means a third of adult life in receipt of the 
state pension. Some question the wisdom of this principle 
in an ageing society, but it does provide a reference point 
so that we can judge what conditions are needed to make 
it sustainable.  Productivity, economic activity rates and life 
expectancy are important factors, and all are influenced by 
the health and fitness of the adult population. 
The stakes are high. The Office for Budget Responsibility 
estimated that spending on the state pension in 2016-
17 totalled £91.6 billion, with 12.9 million recipients 
paid an average of £7,100 each. That would represent 
around 12 per cent of total public spending and 4.7 per 
cent of national income. If the SPA remained at 65, the 
pensionable population would increase to 18.1m by 2040, 
with each extra million people above this age adding 
about £7bn to the annual cost. 
Preventing deterioration in the 
dependency ratio
The dependency ratio is defined as the number of people 
aged between 20 and the SPA divided by the total at SPA 
and above. We note that population projections are built on 
assumptions about future births and deaths, but they also 
depend on immigration, which the government is committed 
to bringing down from 250,000 a year to ‘tens of thousands’. 
Box 6 shows how the dependency ratio has changed since 
1970, and how it is expected to change based on ONS 
population projections to 2040. The ratio was over 4 in 
1970 (i.e. there were 4 working-age adults to each person 
of SPA and above). It then levelled out at around 3.7 until 
2007 when baby boomers started to reach 60. Since then 
it has fallen year on year and is expected to fall further. By 
2040 it would be just above 2, absent changes in the SPA. 
Population projections contain various assumptions 
about future mortality and birth rates. One of the 
ONS assumptions concerns future immigration, 
which has mitigated the drop in the dependency ratio. 
However, several possible scenarios following Brexit 
are not factored in. One is that EU citizens who have 
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settled in the UK will return home; another is that 
UK citizens will emigrate for economic reasons (in the 
1960s and 1970s there were net outflows to countries 
like Australia). The chart in Box 6 shows that (absent 
changes in the SPA) zero net immigration could lower 
the dependency ratio in 2020 from 3.0 to 2.8 and by 
2040 from 2.2 to 2, affecting both the labour market 
and the affordability of the state pension.
The next step of the analysis is to predict what the SPA 
would need to be to keep the dependency ratio constant. 
Recognising that poor health is a limiting factor in 
increasing the number of older workers, we also investigate 
a concept that we call the disability adjusted dependency 
ratio. This removes people who are economically inactive 
due to disability (as defined under the Equality Act 2010) 
from the numerator and adds them to the denominator.
Box 6: The basic dependency ratio
(a) Standard definition of dependency ratio
   =
(b) Dependency ratio adjusted for disability
   =
The numerator excludes people who are economically inactive due to disability as defined under the Equality 
Act 2010. They are added to the denominator and removed from the numerator.
List of variables
 = UK working age population less than state pension age (start age 20)
 = UK Population greater than or equal to state pension age
 = UK population below state pension age who are disability free
 = Inactive UK working age equality act core disabled below state pension age
Source: ONS principal population projections and the APS
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Box 7 combines population projections, cohort life 
expectancy, pension benefits, contribution rates, 
productivity and activity rates to determine what the 
SPAs would need to be to keep the ratios constant. 
Chart (a) is based on the standard definition of the 
dependency ratio, using the population in 2016 and the 
projected population in 2030. It shows that the ratio in 
2016, at 3.24, is closely aligned with the current SPA of 
65, as would be expected. However, using the projected 
population in 2030, the chart shows that the SPA would 
need to increase to 68 in order to maintain the same 
dependency ratio as in 2016 (Point P). Because of the 
curvature of the ratio, relatively small increases in the 
SPA deliver increasing improvements in the ratio. 
Chart (b) repeats this analysis using the disability-adjusted 
definition. It shows that the value of the ratio in 2016, 
at 2.41, is lower than the standard value because more 
people must be supported. The curvature is also reduced, 
which means that greater rises in the SPA are needed 
to deliver the equivalent reductions in dependency – at 
older ages an increasing percentage of the population will 
be inactive disabled. In this case, the SPA would need to 
increase from 65 to 69 to maintain the 2030 disability-
adjusted ratio at the same level as in 2016 (point Q). 
The results show that the SPA needs to increase at a 
faster pace than is currently allowed for in legislation, 
and faster than the Cridland review recommended. This 
suggests that one of the trade-offs would be to abandon 
the one-third principle. Other potential trade-offs – in 
contribution rates, in the relationship between the state 
pension and average earnings and in the ratio itself – are 
set out in Annex C.
The analysis suggests there are limits to the degree 
to which the SPA can be raised without it becoming 
self-defeating. That is, a higher pension age produces 
diminishing improvements in labour supply, as well as 
pushing more people into pensioner poverty or onto 
means-tested disability benefits. The demographic 
challenge is to reduce levels of disability in the 
population, encourage more inactive disabled people 
into work and help people stay healthier for longer. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the government’s response 
includes a manifesto pledge to see one million more disabled 
people in work over the next 10 years (fleshed out by the 
DWP and Department of Health in  ‘Improving Lives: the 
future of work, health and disability’, November 2017). 
Policies to raise significantly the proportion of disabled 
people in work can be controversial, as would be a renewal 
of immigration to swell the supply of economically active 
adults. Measures to free up adults with caring roles so 
that they can work would be less so, but require enhanced 
public services. In the long term, more pro-active public 
and occupational health policies should aim to tackle 
conditions that can cause the early onset of disability, 
such as obesity, diabetes, hypertension, mental illness and 
muscular-skeletal problems. 
How sustainable is the state 
pension system?
At the outset, we defined the ‘dependency trap’ as 
describing a society that is sleep-walking into a conflict 
between the competing needs of an ageing population 
for a decent pension and a working-age population 
that is struggling to save for retirement, with the issues 
compounded by inequalities in health and income.
Is there a simple way of measuring whether a society is 
heading in the right direction? The suggestion of this 
research is that the one-third principle should be used 
as a measure of sustainability (see Box 8). For analytical 
purposes, let us assume that the dependency trap is 
sprung when the proportion of adult life spent after the 
SPA falls below one-third.15
The trap can be avoided or postponed by raising taxes 
(national insurance is included in this umbrella term) or 
increasing the number of economically active working-
age adults, or reducing pension benefits. However, to 
increase their supply, the adult population must grow 
by natural increase or immigration, or economic activity 
rates must improve. 
15.  Note that the one-third principle is controversial. Jane Fuller, for example, calls it ‘generous’, especially if combined with guarantees about maintaining its value 
relative to earnings and inflation. See: Fuller, J. (2015) The Death of Retirement. A CSFI (London) report on innovations in work-based pensions. 
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Box 7: Implied SPA based on standard and disability adjusted dependency ratio
(a) Standard dependency ratio in 2016 and 2030
In order to retain the same dependency ratio in 2030 as in 2016, the SPA should rise from 65 to 68 (point P). 
(b) Disability adjusted dependency ratio in 2016 and 2030
To keep the same ratio between the healthy active population and the disabled inactive population plus those 
over the state pension age, the SPA in 2030 would need to be 69 (point Q). This is one year more than using 
the standard definition.
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Box 8: The one-third principle in practice
The UK government established a link between longevity and the state pension age (SPA) in 2013, stating 
that people should expect to spend, on average, up to one third of their adult life in retirement. Whether this 
materialises or not depends on life expectancy upon reaching the SPA.
There are two methods of calculating life expectancy. The first is known as period life expectancy and is based 
on current mortality rates. The problem is that this fails to take account of future improvements in mortality i.e. 
the ‘goal posts’ keep shifting. The second method, known as cohort life expectancy, takes into account mortality 
improvements over time. 
To illustrate this, the table below shows the SPA ranging from 65 to 70 for three reference years: 2016, 
2030 and 2040, where P is the proportion of adult life spent in retirement and  is the cohort life 
expectancy of a person reaching SPA in any given year. 
The table shows, for example, that the unisex cohort life expectancy of a person with an SPA of 65 in 2016 
is 22.74 years, equating to 34% of adult life based on a start age of 20 (see Annex C for further explanation). 
Since this is greater than 33%, the one-third principle is being met. However, the higher pension age of 67, 
which will be in place in 2030, is estimated to be worth only 32% of adult life. 
If the SPA increases to 68, it will still be worth 32% in 2040, but this crucially assumes that life expectancy will 
continue to improve at the indicated rate. If, by then, the SPA has climbed higher than 68 to, say, 70 for other 
reasons, it will be worth only 29%, so falling significantly short of one-third of adult life.
To preserve the one-third principle in each future year, the results imply that the SPA would need to be between 
65 and 66 in 2016, between 66 and 67 in 2030, and 67 in 2040. As we have seen the demographic pressure is 
for faster rises in SPA than are scheduled. This suggests that the 2030s could see the one-third principle being 
abandoned.
State 
Pension age
P P P
65 22.74 0.34 24.26 0.35 25.30 0.36
66 21.82 0.32 23.33 0.34 24.36 0.35
67 20.92 0.31 22.41 0.32 23.42 0.33
68 19.96 0.29 21.50 0.31 22.50 0.32
69 19.12 0.28 20.60 0.30 21.58 0.31
70 18.24 0.27 19.72 0.28 20.68 0.29
Source: ONS
Key: P is the proportion of adult life spent in retirement and  is cohort life expectancy for a person 
reaching SPA in the given year.
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If we take 2040, for example, ONS population 
projections show that the dependency ratio would only 
be 68% of its level in 2017, if the SPA remained at 65. 
To meet the PAYG principle, there would need to be 
an approximate 50% increase in contribution levels, or 
activity rates of well over 100%!
The government would like to avoid both tax increases 
and a reduction in pension benefits. Its preferred 
mechanism is to increase the SPA, while maintaining 
the pension relative to earnings and inflation. This is 
possible as long as rises in life expectancy align with the 
one-third principle and earnings go up.
However, rises in the SPA will not solve the problem if 
this fails to increase the supply of economically active, 
working-age adults sufficiently to meet the PAYG 
principle. This could occur if the prevalence of disability 
worsens, or if disability-free life expectancy at older 
ages does not keep pace with life expectancy; if life 
expectancy itself does not advance as fast as expected; or 
if productivity – and hence earnings – at older ages does 
not improve.
Disability in younger adults affects their capacity to work 
according to its severity and whether it affects the activities 
of daily living. However, even less severe types of disability 
can adversely affect productivity, and increase absenteeism 
and the probability of unemployment.
Table 1 showed that, for the 50-64 age group, there were 
7.03m economically active disability-free people, 1.54m 
disability-free inactive people and 2.9m with disabilities, 
of whom just over half were economically active. Post- 
65, information about economic activity is less reliable, 
but the data show that only 60% of the population is 
still disability-free at this age.
It can be assumed that increasing immigration to solve 
any labour shortage would not be popular, given the 
Brexit vote. Indeed, government policy is to reduce it. In 
any case, immigrants will themselves become pensioners 
at some point. This means that improvements in activity 
rates will be needed, especially at older ages – and 
improvements in health would make this easier to achieve. 
The benefits would include higher earnings for older 
workers, allowing them to set aside more money for a DC, 
or private, pension to supplement the state pension. 
Implications: retirement income
An important question concerns replacement 
income: what percentage of pre-retirement income 
does a person need post-retirement (allowing for 
lower living expenses)? The benchmarks used by the 
Pensions Commission, in 2005, ranged from 80% of 
pre-retirement earnings for a low-paid person to 50% 
for someone on relatively high pay. In the middle, for 
someone on average pay, the benchmark is two-
thirds, similar to the traditional DB level. 
The average state pension is worth about one-third 
of average wages, and so to bring income up to 
a two-thirds replacement rate an occupational or 
private pension would need to be similar to the size 
of the state pension. There is, of course, a huge 
variation in the pot sizes needed to provide adequate 
replacement income for the full range of earners. For 
lower paid people, the state pension forms a much 
bigger proportion of post-retirement income, but a 
£100,000 pot would still be needed to add about 
50% to the new state pension. 
The report’s message is that people need a bespoke 
calculator – taking account of irregular contribution 
patterns – that can indicate whether they are on track 
for an appropriately sized pension pot. If not, they will 
need to explore other options including working for 
longer and monetising value in the home. 
CSFI
32 CSFI  –  73 Leadenhall Market, London EC3V 1LT  –  Tel: 020 7621 1056  –  E-mail: info@csfi.org  –  Web: www.csfi.org
Chapter 5: 
‘Active Ageing’ Scenario
To generate different scenarios, we combine data on 
population projections by single year of age with policy 
inputs, which consist of three components. The first 
is the desired replacement ratio of the state pension to 
average earnings: we use the current average of one third. 
It is worth remembering that the UK state pension is 
not generous by developed world standards. The new 
state pension of about £8,300 a year (at £159.55 per 
week) is just under a third of the current average wage 
of £26,520 (at £510 pw) and little more than half of a 
year’s full-time earnings on the national living wage of 
£7.50 an hour.
Current government policy of raising the state pension 
by the ‘triple lock’ – the highest of average pay rises, 
inflation or 2.5% – is set to give way in 2020 to a 
‘double lock’ linked to earnings or price growth. For 
our scenarios we assume a constant replacement ratio of 
a third. 
The second policy lever is the contribution rate, 
defined as the average amount to be deducted from 
wages to finance the forecast stream of pension benefits. 
It is currently between 13% and 14%. We compare 
the effects of those two rates on the SPA, dependency 
ratio and proportion of adult life in receipt of the state 
pension.
The third policy lever involves both labour market and 
health policy. To increase activity rates, particularly 
at older ages, barriers to work need to be minimised: 
a good example of this is the scrapping of the default 
retirement age in 2011. It will also require improvements 
in health, the policies for which should seek to delay or 
manage better long-term health conditions. 
A full discussion of each policy lever is beyond the 
scope of this research, but the important point is to 
identify and head off problems before they take effect: 
for example, it is easier to prevent obesity than it is to 
cure it, and better to deal with mental health problems – 
another key cause of economic inactivity – early. 
The model uses this information and solves for 
the value of the SPA that would exactly balance 
contributions and pension benefits for any year in the 
future. The final results include not only pension age, 
but also the dependency ratio and proportion of adult 
life (from age 20) spent in retirement, using the SPA as 
the benchmark. 
To make this as realistic as possible the model uses 
cohort life expectancy, rather than current mortality 
rates. This is important since the longevity goalposts are 
always shifting. Figure 4 shows how the model works. 
Scenarios for different   
activity rates
We tested three scenarios to determine what the SPA 
would need to be to balance contributions in 2016, 
2030 and 2040 and, additionally, what their effects 
would be on the dependency ratio and proportion of life 
spent in receipt of the state pension.  All are well within 
the range of plausible outcomes: 
A. Average activity rate remains at 80%: Workers adjust 
to rises in the SPA from the current level by working 
for longer with no overall change to the average 
activity rate. This outcome would be regarded as a 
partial success.
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Figure 4: Flow diagram showing how the SPA, the dependency ratio and proportion of life spent in 
retirement are determined
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B. Average activity rate falls to 75%. Workers do not 
adjust to a higher pension age. This would be seen 
as a policy failure, especially if accompanied by no 
improvement in health.
C. Average activity rate increases to 85%. Activity 
rates increase by 5 percentage points at every age, 
or there is an approximate 17.5 percentage point 
rise in activity rates in adults from age 50, where 
there is greatest unused capacity. Implied in this 
scenario are improvements in health and the 
implementation of policies that are effective in 
encouraging older people to work. This would be  
a very good outcome.
The scenarios assume that the ratio of average earnings 
to pension benefits is unchanged. Also included is 
the effect of a one percentage point difference in the 
contribution rate, indicating that this could be employed 
as an alternative to increasing the SPA. 
Scenario A, our baseline, shows the SPA in 2016 at age 
65 and, therefore, indicates that the model accurately 
replicates present policy. In general, the results show that 
any decrease in activity rates causes the required SPA to 
rise and any improvement causes it to decrease. Even 
with significant expansion of the older population, the 
SPA in the coming decades remains below 70 in all the 
scenarios except for scenario B in 2040, based on a fall in 
activity rates to 75%. 
Even small rises in the SPA could potentially reduce 
the percentage of adult life in receipt of the pension. 
Scenario B, for example, shows that this proportion 
would decrease from a high of 0.34 in 2016 to 0.31 in 
2030 due to falling activity rates, unless mitigated by 
raising the contribution rate to 14%.
For any given scenario, the dependency ratio is 
unchanged and is an outcome of the PAYG principle, 
with the ratio of earnings to pension benefits kept 
constant. If pension benefits are increased from a 
third of average earnings to a half, the SPA and the 
dependency ratio must increase since more workers are 
needed to support higher pension benefits. 
Scenario C, which results in the smallest increases in 
the SPA, depends on improvements in activity rates. 
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This scenario is also a good, but not exact, fit with the 
one-third principle. The key point is that it allows for a 
lower dependency ratio and so means that the system is 
sustainable with fewer workers per pensioner. 
Finally, it is worth noting that where higher activity rates 
are the result of fewer people being long-term sick or 
disabled, with fewer people looking after them, this will 
have the effect of boosting activity rates, increasing the 
proportion of people in full-time work and reducing the 
cost of disability benefits. We call Scenario C the ‘active 
ageing scenario’.
Table 4: Modelling the effects of scenarios A-C on the SPA, the dependency ratio and the 
percentage of adult life spent in receipt of the state pension
Scenario Description Activity rate Effective 
contribution 
rate
Outcome 2016 2030 2040
A
Activity rate 
unchanged
80%
13% SPA 65.0 67.8 69.3
DR 3.21 3.21 3.21
% adult life 0.35 0.32 0.31
14% SPA 64.0 66.9 68.2
DR 2.98 2.98 2.98
% adult life 0.35 0.32 0.32
B
Activity rate 
falls
75%
13% SPA 65.8 68.6 70.2
DR 3.42 3.42  3.42
% adult life 0.34 0.31 0.31
14% SPA 64.8 67.7 69.1
DR 3.17 3.17 3.17
% adult life 0.35 0.32 0.32
C
Activity rate 
improves
85%
13% SPA 64.2 67.1 68.4
DR 3.02 3.02 3.02
% adult life 0.35 0.32 0.32
14% SPA 63.2 66.1 67.3
DR 2.80 2.80 2.80
% adult life 0.35 0.34 0.33
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Implications: financial needs and the life cycle
The shift from a DB to a DC world means that 
individuals are shouldering more of the responsibility 
for their financial wellbeing in later life. Saving for this 
and utilising those funds span the whole of adult life. 
The choices are complex, and people depend on the 
financial services industry both to advise them and to 
provide the products that put their plans into action. 
One way of looking at this is to map a person’s 
potential financial needs to their life cycle. The rolling 
phases might run as follows:
Working age
1. Protection might be needed against loss of 
earnings e.g. insurance for the self-employed  
and deferred annuities to cover carers’ career 
breaks.
2. To maximise the amount saved into pension 
funds over a working life, incentives (employers’ 
contributions and tax relief) are crucially 
important, as are explanations of the role played 
by investment returns.
3. To help people monitor their progress towards 
savings goals requires not only delivery of an 
industry-standard ‘pensions dashboard’, but also 
bespoke calculators to take into account different 
contribution patterns.
Transition from peak earnings to retirement
4. This phase can be regarded as starting at 50, 
when average earnings start to decline. With the 
SPA rising and more people working beyond it, 
it could last 20 years. The inter-related factors 
affecting saving include: continuing to work, 
wage levels, continuing to save (invest in risk 
assets), debt reduction, home ownership (paying 
off the mortgage). 
5. The Cridland review advocated a ‘Mid-life MoT’. 
This implies further development of affordable 
advice and guidance services aimed at those 
aged 50-plus, which would take all the above 
factors into account.
Retirement
6. How to turn a pension pot(s) into income? 
People need help with choices between lump 
sum withdrawals, annuities and drawdown, or a 
combination of these. 
7. There is scope for expansion of the market for 
insurance products to cover end-of-life care costs.
8. Equity release, which has an impact on both 
lifestyles and potential legacies, becomes an 
important part of the choices facing those who 
own their home.
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Chapter 6:
Discussion of main findings
Key economic messages
There are four economic messages from our analysis: 
•	 First, if the UK is to succeed economically in the 
coming decades, increases in life expectancy need 
to be balanced by improvements in working life 
expectancy and disability-free life expectancy. 
•	 Second, failure to do so could lead to renewed 
pressure to increase immigration as a means to 
expand the working-age population. 
•	 Third, higher productivity may offset these 
pressures to some extent. But since earnings peak in 
middle age, an ageing workforce needs to be more 
productive and the earnings of older workers need to 
rise relative to the average. 
•	 Fourth, while a growing population will lead to 
greater GDP it may not translate into improved 
GDP per capita, and under some scenarios living 
standards could fall. Higher life-time earnings are 
needed both to deliver improved standards of living 
and to pay sufficient taxes to maintain the value of 
the state pension. 
Demographic messages
The UK’s population is due to grow from 66m to 76m 
between now and 2045, and the trend towards higher 
life expectancy is set to continue. With fewer people of 
working age relative to those above it, the dependency 
ratio would fall to around two workers for every pensioner 
without remedial action. Net immigration has totalled 
around 3m since 2000, but the government’s plan to limit 
it has the potential for a further adverse impact on the 
dependency ratio. The demographic problem must be 
managed using all the policy tools available. 
To date the government’s preferred response has been to 
increase the SPA, rather than to increase taxes or reduce 
pensioner benefits. From a fiscal perspective, an increase 
in the SPA from, say, 66 to 67 would, in theory, save 
about £5 billion a year, but the actual saving would be 
only around 75% of this because it is partially offset by 
a rise in the number of people receiving working-age 
disability benefits.
As for how many people could work until much later in 
life, the number of disability-free, economically inactive 
adults declines sharply after 70. This limits the reservoir 
of people who are able to fill the labour gap. 
At present, public policy is for up to a third of adult 
life to be spent in receipt of the state pension. While 
arbitrary, this provides a benchmark since it combines 
longevity, taxation, pension benefits and productivity. 
This report finds that a one-third target will not be 
sustainable unless there are improvements in economic 
activity rates.
Two further findings are that there are limits to 
increasing both the SPA and activity rates. It is worth 
emphasising that in some districts of the UK, healthy life 
expectancy at age 50 falls short of the SPA, and many 
inhabitants already face the prospect of their retirement 
falling well short of one-third of their adult life.
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Although there is evidence of progress in improving the 
activity rates of older workers, a step-change improvement 
is needed, as indicated in the ‘active ageing scenario’. The 
demographic pressures are such that both economic activity 
and (related) savings rates must rise to prevent individuals 
facing a big drop in living standards beyond the SPA.
Adequacy of private pensions
The UK has a multi-pillar pension system: pillar one is 
the state pension; two is occupational pensions – DB and 
DC schemes; three is private pensions in which anyone 
can invest, and it is also the main option for the self-
employed.  Under pillar one, the state pension regime 
introduced in 2016 provides a ‘single tier’ pension, set 
above the basic level of means-tested support. This entails 
phasing out the additional earnings-related state pension 
(known as SERPS or the Second State Pension).
Even though the new single-tier state pension is 
higher than the old ‘basic’ one, the replacement value 
(compared with pre-retirement income) is low compared 
with other developed countries – hence the need for 
adequate second and/or third pillars to supplement it. 
The government is tackling the problem by requiring 
employers to automatically enrol employees into a DC 
pension fund and to make contributions.
According to the DWP’s ‘Automatic Enrolment 
Review 2017: Maintaining the Momentum’, published 
in December, nine million individuals have been 
automatically enrolled into a workplace scheme by 
their employer, with nine out of every ten of them 
continuing to save. Many were previously saving little 
or nothing for retirement. 
While the opt-out rate from AE pension schemes 
remains low, so are contribution levels (although they are 
set to reach 8% of salary by 2019-20). A related issue is 
that the life-cycle pattern of average earnings does not 
deliver sufficiently large pension pots for many people, 
especially women. 
The strength of the UK pension system is its flexibility. 
A person can start taking benefits before the SPA and 
funds are relatively portable between jobs. Relatively new 
pension ‘freedoms’ (of access and without mandatory 
annuity purchase) offer potential bridges to cover falling 
economic activity between 50 and the SPA. But those 
with low contribution rates and interrupted saving 
patterns will not accumulate pension pots large enough 
to make a significant addition to the state pension in later 
life. This underlines the need for saving to start early, and 
to continue with as little interruption as possible. 
According to this research, it is necessary for average 
earnings to peak later and the subsequent decline to slow 
down, if pension savings are to increase. This is already 
happening with the peak earnings age advancing by 
about three years in the last ten, but productivity also 
needs to be higher. Contributing more and working 
for longer is the logical response to the rising SPA and 
increasing longevity. 
Where this is not possible, two alternative ways to 
supplement pensions are, first, for working partners to 
be allowed to contribute, with tax relief, to their non-
working partners’ pension fund and, second, to monetise 
property – an important source of financial independence 
in later life. Developments in value-for-money equity 
release products are an important factor here.
Health prospects
The current legal position is that the SPA for women 
is due to increase to 65 by November 2018, to 66 for 
both sexes by October 2020 and to 67 by 2028. John 
Cridland, who led the 2016-17 review of the SPA, 
recommended it should rise from 67 to 68 by 2037-39, 
seven years earlier than previously timetabled by the 
government. It is estimated that these changes will affect 
about 5.4m people aged under 45. 
This research finds that even Cridland’s tighter timetable 
may be hard to deliver because it requires demanding 
increases in economic activity rates, especially among 
older adults, to sustain the PAYG principle. To achieve 
a significant rise in activity rates, there needs to be 
accompanying improvements in health – especially in 
disability-free life expectancy from age 50 onwards. 
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A large body of evidence shows that inequalities in 
health are a root cause of persistent variations in both life 
expectancy and healthy life expectancy in many districts 
of the UK, where many will not be able to work even to 
the current SPA. 
A strategically important finding is that by delaying the 
onset of a limiting illness, the proportion of remaining 
adult life spent in ill health is significantly reduced. For 
example, a person acquiring a long-term illness at age 20 
can expect, on average, another 43 years of life, at age 50 
it is 26.3 years and at age 65, 17.7 years. 
Contracting a long-term illness at any age is bad for 
the individual but also for society because it affects 
employment, leads to higher healthcare costs and 
accelerates dependency. Early last century clean drinking 
water, improved sanitation, greater health and safety 
at work, affordable housing and cleaner air were 
instrumental in advancing life expectancy. The health 
benefits that derived from these improvements generally 
pre-dated the big advances in healthcare, with the 
exception of mass vaccination against infectious diseases.
In the modern period, these examples cannot be relied 
upon to produce further improvements. This is because 
there has been a transformation in the way people die. 
Most deaths today are from chronic diseases, rather than 
infectious ones or other causes including accidents at work. 
We know that nearly all chronic disease is associated with 
middle to old age and that it affects various strands of 
society differently. Where exposure to harm is the result 
of lifestyle rather than ambient risks, it is more difficult 
to tackle via public policy, although there is scope to do 
so. Tobacco smoking, for instance, still causes about one 
in six deaths and shortens lifespan and disability free life 
expectancy by as much as 10 years.16 Given the greatly 
reduced incidence of smoking, a complete cessation would 
add, on average, about two healthy life years. 
Obesity – a growing trend – also reduces healthy 
life expectancy. It is linked to poor diet and a lack of 
exercise, including the consumption of high levels of 
sugar in processed food. The government has started to 
take action on the sugar issue.
The negative outcomes of unhealthy lifestyles are 
disproportionately associated with the poorest in society. 
This suggests that, for long-term impact, more resources 
should be focused on encouraging healthier lifestyles. 
Implications for the   
private sector
Responsibility for the recruitment, retention and 
remuneration of older workers lies with employers – as 
do the pay and benefits that contribute to all employees’ 
wealth and savings. 
Employers also have an interest in promoting better 
health to reduce absenteeism and improve productivity. 
Some make a virtue of their ‘staff wellbeing’ programmes 
– the British Heart Foundation is one of the 
organisations that produces case studies.
Responsibility for the delivery of private savings and 
pensions rests mainly with the financial services sector. A 
key problem for savers is uncertainty about the eventual 
size of their pension pot(s), in particular the combined 
value of the various schemes to which they may have 
contributed in their working lifetime. 
This indicates the urgency of delivering not only a 
pensions dashboard, but easy-to-understand information 
about other savings, and about debt. It is beyond the remit 
of this report to cover the debate about financial advice 
and guidance. However, financial services companies 
have been innovating with budgeting tools, prompts to 
save and warnings when overdrafts are triggered. Pension 
providers, such as Nest, the government-backed AE 
pension fund, also have simple pension calculators on 
their website. So-called ‘robo-advisers’ have made progress 
in automating the know-your-customer process and using 
that information to guide choices of savings product – for 
instance, by level of risk appetite.
16.  Doll, R., R. Peto, J. Boreham, and I. Sutherland. (2004). Mortality in relation to smoking: 50 years' observations on male British doctors. BMJ 2004; 328:1519
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There is also a lack of clarity over how to turn DC 
pension savings into income and how to find the best 
deals for, say, annuities. An important aspect of this is 
an explanation of the advantages and disadvantages of 
staying invested in riskier assets. Other factors to be 
taken into account include home ownership, legacies and 
capacity to work/earn into old age, as 1.2m adults aged 
65-plus already do.
This means that the financial services sector needs 
to offer savings products that are better adapted to 
the circumstances of individuals at different stages of 
their adult lives. Important factors are potential career 
interruptions, part-time working and care responsibilities 
– as well as overall household wealth. 
In later life, funding sources may include tax-free lump 
sums, inheritance windfalls, profits from downsizing and 
equity release, as well as pension income. Benefits could 
be deferred, capped at certain ages, disability-linked or 
life-long, assuming that costs are actuarially fair and 
charges transparent. 
The DC world has switched responsibility for maintaining 
living standards in old age to the individual. This means 
each person has to manage the interactions between the 
capacity to work, earn and save for the majority of their 
adult life; and then decide how best to deploy whatever 
sums or assets they have accumulated. Beyond taxpayer-
funded safety nets, including the state pension, the private 
sector has the primary role in helping those individuals – 
in all their different circumstances – fulfil these daunting 
tasks. Because of the long-term nature of pension-saving 
(and the fragmentation of careers), the role of the financial 
services sector is more challenging than that of employers.
This report advocates an ‘active-ageing’ scenario, 
which would result in a population whose (sometimes 
competing) interests – old/young, poorer/richer, 
women’s/men’s pensions – are in better balance. It would 
also increase living standards and GDP growth. 
This would involve improvements in health and 
working life expectancy, and in supply side conditions 
including job creation, family-friendly policies, 
occupational health and productivity. The greater 
lifetime earnings that this scenario would deliver need 
to be deployed in savings, protection and retirement-
income products that help individuals shoulder the 
responsibilities of a DC world. 
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Annex A: Definitions of inactivity and disability 
under the Equality Act
Changes introduced in 2013 brought the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) into line with the Government Statistical 
Service (GSS) harmonised standards for questions 
on disability. This enabled the LFS estimates to be 
consistent with the definitions used in the 2010 Equality 
Act. This research is based on the current harmonised 
definition.
i. Determination of the inactive population
To decide whether someone is active or inactive, 
respondents aged 16-plus to the LFS give their 
employment status as employed, self-employed, 
unemployed, on a government training scheme, an 
unpaid family worker or inactive. The inactive categories 
relating to the inactive sick and disabled using LFS 
nomenclature are as follows:
1. Inactive – seeking work, unavailable, long-term sick 
or disabled
2. Inactive – not seeking work, would like work, long-
term sick or disabled
3. Inactive – not seeking work, would not like work, 
long-term sick or disabled
ii. Determination of disability status
LNGLST: Health problems lasting or expected to last 
more than one year
Do you have any physical or mental health conditions or 
illnesses lasting or expected to last 12 months or more?
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don’t know (spontaneous only) 
(4) Refusal (spontaneous only) 
LIMACT: Does the health problem limit activity?
Does your condition or illness reduce your ability to carry 
out day-to-day activities?
(1) Yes, a lot 
(2) Yes, a little 
(3) Not at all
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Figure B1: Decision tree showing the determination of whether a person is disabled under the 
Equality Act (2010) using Government Statistical Service (GSS) harmonised definition based on 
the Labour Force Survey 
Key:
DISEA: Disability: Equality Act (GSS harmonised)
LNGLST: Health problems lasting or expected to last more than 1 year
LIMACT: Does health problem limit activity?
GSS: Government Statistical Service
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17.  In practice, insurance companies may use a slightly higher interest rate when pricing annuities (which, in itself, would lead to a slightly higher level of annual 
annuity income). However, this will be offset by additional loadings in the annuity price for expenses, profit and the longevity risk transferred to the company. 
Thus, an assumed (real) interest rate of 0% per annum seems appropriate here. 
18.  Under the gender equality regulations, the same amount must be offered to both males and females. Prior to 21 December 2012, males could be offered a higher 
annuity of                                      reflecting their lower future life expectancy, whereas females would be offered a lower annuity of                                        
 reflecting their higher future life expectancy.
Annex B: Annuity values based on pension  
pot size
An annuity is a sum of money, either fixed or increasing, 
that is paid regularly to the policyholder, typically for the 
rest of their life. It is usually purchased at the time of 
retirement using the accumulated funds in a pension pot. 
The important point about annuities is that they provide 
income security until death. If a person lives to an old 
age, the annuitant benefits; whereas if they die earlier 
than expected, the insurer benefits. Thus, the person 
is effectively insuring themselves against running out of 
money due to living longer than expected and, in addition, 
protecting themselves against poor investment returns. 
Under gender equality regulation, gender is no longer a 
relevant consideration when pricing annuities. To create 
a unisex annuity rate, our population at age 65 is made 
up of equal numbers of males and females, so the 
mortality rates reflect the entire population.
Assuming a long-term risk-free (real) interest rate of 0% 
per annum17, an indexed linked annuity initially paying 
one pound per annum to a person at 65, denoted by   
 , is given by the discounted value of the expected 
future annuity payments such that:
where  is the current discounted value of a payment 
of 1 made at some future time  ,  is the probability 
that a person of 65 will survive to age (  ) using the 
ONS life tables that allow for mortality improvements. 
Because we have used a real rate of interest of 0% pa, 
the price of the annuity at age 65,  , is equal to the 
future life expectancy at that age,  .
Further, because the mortality table used is unisex, the 
future life expectancy at 65 is an average of male life 
expectancy of 21.9 years and female life expectancy of 
24.3 years, after taking longevity drift into account. 
Hence, a pension pot of £100,000, at age 65, can 
purchase an annual inflation-proofed annuity that will 
provide an initial annual income of:
100,000
23.1010
Applying this formula to the accumulated illustrative 
pension savings for men and women set out in Box 5, 
the following annuities would be payable. These amounts 
are not guaranteed: they depend on market rates at the 
time of purchase and on the type of annuity purchased.
= £4,328.8218
= £4,567.15100,00021.8955 = £4,123.44
100,000
24.2516
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(a) Men
End age
Start age 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
20 0.0 1.2 2.9 5.1 7.6 10.2 12.9 15.5 17.9 19.8
25   0.0 2.0 4.2 6.7 9.3 12.0 14.6 17.0 19.7
30   0.0 2.5 5.0 7.7 10.3 12.9 15.3 17.3
35   0.0 2.9 5.6 8.2 10.9 13.2 15.2
40   0.0 3.1 5.8 8.4 10.8 12.8
45   0.0 3.2 5.8 8.2 10.2
50   0.0 3.1 5.5 7.5
55   0.0 2.9 4.9
60   0.0 2.4
65                   0.0
(b) Women
End age
Start age 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
20 0.0 0.9 2.3 3.9 5.5 7.0 8.5 9.9 11.3 12.3
25   0.0 1.6 3.1 4.7 6.3 7.8 9.2 10.6 11.1
30   0.0 1.8 3.4 5.0 6.5 7.9 9.2 10.3
35   0.0 1.9 3.4 5.0 6.4 7.7 8.8
40   0.0 1.9 3.4 4.8 6.1 7.2
45   0.0 1.8 3.3 4.6 5.6
50   0.0 1.7 3.1 4.1
55   0.0 1.6 2.7
60   0.0 1.3
65                   0.0
Units: £000s p.a
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Annex C: Trade-offs between the SPA, 
dependency ratio, one-third principle and 
replacement value of the state pension
(a) PAYG pension systems
In a PAYG system the challenge is to balance revenues 
and pensioner benefits taking one year with another. The 
levers available to do this are tax (or contribution rates), 
pension benefits, the SPA, average earnings (i.e. labour 
productivity) and labour supply. Mathematically speaking: 
Where
 = Average earnings before tax
 = Tax or contribution rate
 = Activity rate or proportion of people   
  economically active
 = Average value of the state pension
The problem is to find the value of the SPA, in this case 
the ‘unknown’, such that this equation is in equilibrium 
for different values of tax (i.e. contribution) and activity 
rates. That is:
Where  is a constant
We call the ratio  , i.e. average earnings divided by 
the state pension, the ‘earnings-pension multiple’. 
One divided by this quantity multiplied by 100 is more 
commonly known as the pension ‘replacement ratio’.
A constant earnings-pension multiple indicates that 
pension benefits relative to earnings are unchanged 
over time; an increasing multiple means that earnings 
are increasing faster than the state pension, and a falling 
earnings-pension multiple means the opposite. In a 
system in which pension benefits are linked to earnings, 
pensioners will automatically benefit from rises in 
productivity. Since pension benefits are currently linked 
to both consumer prices and earnings, whichever is the 
higher, the tendency will be for the earnings-pension 
multiple to fall over time (i.e. state pensioners will be 
better off relatively speaking).
(b)  Determining SPA under conditions of fiscal 
balance
Consider Figure C, which is a stylised diagram of the UK 
population showing the number of adults by age.  To 
determine the SPA, the dependency ratio age and the 
proportion of adult life spent in retirement, only three 
demographic parameters are required: Q, N and Xm.     
Q is defined as the ‘pivot age’ which can be thought of 
as the age of onset of mortality in the population, N is 
the age at which adulthood is assumed to start (in this 
case age 20), and Xm is the oldest age to which anyone 
survives. The SPA is denoted by X.
In PAYG terms, the inflow of funds equals the population 
contained in areas (III) and (II) of the chart which are 
under SPA multiplied by the average wage times the 
activity rate times the contribution rate. The outflow of 
funds is given by the population above SPA denoted by 
X contained in section (I) of the chart multiplied by the 
average value of the state pension. 
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Figure C: Stylised chart of the UK adult population
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Although it is assumed that the start of adulthood is 
fixed at age 20, Q and Xm can change over time usually 
as a result of improvements in mortality. We estimate 
Q and Xm using linear regression in combination with 
single year of age ONS population projections. These 
provide very accurate and efficient replacements for the 
population quantities (I), (II) and (III) in each projection 
year and significantly simplify the calculations. 
Based on this reduced number of parameters, we 
determine fiscal balance occurs, i.e. outflow equals 
inflow, when:
Where    =  
 = Economic activity rate, a parameter that can  
  be used to adjust for disability
 = Contribution rate or tax
 = Average earnings as a multiple of the state  
  pension
And
 = maximum age which varies by year
 = is the number of years from when adult age is  
  assumed to begin to pivot age Q
 = SPA
Balance is achieved when  is equal to:
Using the above we can determine the SPA, which 
balances inflows and outflows for any combination of 
contribution rates, pension benefits and wages.  
(c) The proportion of adult life spent in retirement
To determine the proportion of adult life spent in receipt 
of the state pension, we need to know the cohort life 
expectancy of that individual taking into account future 
improvements in mortality rates. 
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We use ONS forecasts of cohort life expectancy by 
single year of age to determine what proportion of an 
individual’s future adult life will be spent in receipt of the 
state pension post SPA.
The approach adopted follows closely that of the 
Government Actuary, published in March 201719,   
which is as follows:
Where
 = Life expectancy at SPA
 = Proportion of adult life in receipt of SPA
SPA = State pension age
 = Assumed adult start age
19.  State Pension age periodic review: A report by the Government Actuary. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/state-pension-age-periodic-review-report-
by-the-government-actuary
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Illustrative tables of results
The following tables show how the results are presented for a single point in time  (in this case 2016): (a) the 
impact on the SPA of different combinations of the replacement ratio (expressed as an earnings-pension 
multiple) and tax, or contribution, rates; (b) the impact on the dependency ratio given the SPA in (a); and (c) the 
impact of the SPA in (a) on the proportion of adult life spent in receipt of the state pension. Column headings 
show the ratio of earnings to pension values, and row headings the contribution rate. The circled numbers 
show, approximately, the current situation, with an SPA of 65, a contribution rate of 13% and, potentially, 35% 
of adult life in receipt of the state pension.
(a) SPA
Earnings-pension multiple
Contribution rate 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
0.10 80.1 76.2 73.1 70.5 68.3 66.4 64.7 63.1 61.7 60.4 59.3
0.11 79.2 75.2 72.0 69.4 67.1 65.1 63.4 61.8 60.4 59.1 58.0
0.12 78.4 74.3 71.0 68.3 66.0 64.0 62.2 60.7 59.3 58.0 56.8
0.13 77.6 73.4 70.1 67.3 65.0 63.0 61.2 59.6 58.2 56.9 55.7
0.14 76.9 72.6 69.2 66.4 64.0 62.0 60.2 58.6 57.2 55.9 54.7
0.15 76.2 71.8 68.3 65.5 63.1 61.0 59.3 57.7 56.3 55.0 53.8
0.16 75.5 71.0 67.5 64.7 62.2 60.2 58.4 56.8 55.4 54.1 53.0
0.17 74.9 70.3 66.7 63.9 61.4 59.4 57.6 56.0 54.6 53.3 52.2
0.18 74.3 69.6 66.0 63.1 60.7 58.6 56.8 55.2 53.8 52.6 51.5
0.19 73.7 69.0 65.3 62.4 59.9 57.9 56.1 54.5 53.1 51.9 50.8
0.20 73.1 68.3 64.7 61.7 59.3 57.2 55.4 53.8 52.5 51.2 50.1
(b) DR
Earnings-pension multiple
Contribution rate 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
0.10 12.5 8.3 6.3 5.0 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.11 11.4 7.6 5.7 4.5 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9
0.12 10.4 6.9 5.2 4.2 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.13 9.6 6.4 4.8 3.8 3.2 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6
0.14 8.9 6.0 4.5 3.6 3.0 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.15 8.3 5.6 4.2 3.3 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4
0.16 7.8 5.2 3.9 3.1 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3
0.17 7.4 4.9 3.7 2.9 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.2
0.18 6.9 4.6 3.5 2.8 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
0.19 6.6 4.4 3.3 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1
0.20 6.3 4.2 3.1 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0
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(c) P
Earnings-pension multiple
Contribution rate 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
0.10 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.42
0.11 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.45
0.12 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.47
0.13 0.18 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.48
0.14 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.50
0.15 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.50 0.51
0.16 0.20 0.25 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.53
0.17 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.53
0.18 0.22 0.28 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.54
0.19 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.54 0.55
0.20 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.55
Key:
SPA = state pension age
DR = dependency ratio
P = proportion of adult life in receipt of the state pension
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